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DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS AGAINST
PROSECUTORS FOR BRADY VIOLATIONS:
A PAPER TIGER
RICHARD A. ROSENt
The integrity of our criminal justice system is of vital importance to
all of us. The presentation offalse evidence by prosecutors or their con-
cealment of exculpatory evidence clearly undermines this integrity.
Moreover, over the last eighty years a body of legal and ethical rules has
developed that imposes on prosecutors a duty to reveal exculpatory evi-
dence and to prohibit the presentation of false evidence. However, the
development of these rules has given rise to a second question: To what
extent have these rules been applied to deter prosecutors from engaging
in such conduct? In this Article Professor Rosen considers this question,
focusing on the ethical rules that require prosecutors to reveal exculpa-
tory evidence and prohibit them from presenting false evidence. To de-
termine the extent to which the rules have been applied, Professor Rosen
surveyed all available printed sources. In addition, he surveyed the law-
yer disciplinary bodies in each of the fifty states and the District of Co-
lumbia. The research indicates that disciplinary charges have been
brought infrequently under the applicable rules and that meaningful
sanctions have been applied only rarely. Professor Rosen concludes with
three recommendations intended to alleviate this problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Preparing for trial in a robbery case, a prosecutor reads a police report
containing information that an eyewitness identified someone other than the de-
fendant as the lone robber. In another case that is already on trial, a prosecutor,
listening to the cross-examination of a prosecution witness, hears the witness
state that the government made no promises to him in return for his testimony.
Two weeks previously, this prosecutor had personally promised this witness that
all charges would be dismissed against him if he testified for the government.
Should these prosecutors reveal this evidence concerning the identification
of another suspect and the promise to the witness? Both legally and ethically,
the answer is clearly yes. Over the last eighty years a body of legal and ethical
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rules has developed that requires prosecutors to reveal evidence favorable to the
defense and prohibits them from presenting false testimony. The development
of these rules, however, has given rise to a second question: To what extent have
the rules been applied to deter prosecutors from withholding exculpatory evi-
dence or presenting false evidence?
The answer to this question is of utmost importance to our criminal justice
system. Prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence or presentation of
false evidence is not an isolated phenomenon.' Whenever a prosecutor sup-
presses exculpatory evidence or presents false evidence, these actions cast doubt
on the integrity of our legal system and the accuracy of the determinations of
guilt and punishment.
Of course, suppression or falsification of relevant evidence by any lawyer
undermines the integrity and accuracy of a legal proceeding, but this effect is
compounded in the case of a prosecutor because of the prosecutor's dominant
role in the criminal justice system. A prosecutor at the local, state, or federal
level, who has at his or her disposal a large array of investigative capabilities,
generally commands resources vastly superior to those available to the defense
attorney,2 who most often represents an indigent client. 3 In civil cases extensive
discovery may help to equalize any inequality in resources, but in criminal cases
1. See infra notes 19-52 and accompanying text.
2. As Professor Goldstein has noted, "Both doctrinally and practically, criminal procedure, as
presently constituted, does not give the accused 'every advantage' but, instead, gives overwhelming
advantage to the prosecution." Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1152 (1960); see also Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the
Prosecutors Duty to Disclose, 40 U, Cm. L. REv. 112, 112 (1972) [hereinafter Comment, Brady v.
Maryland] (discussing government's "vastly superior ability to discover information concerning the
alleged crime"); Comment, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defend-
ant, 74 YALE L.J. 136, 142-43 (1964) [hereinafter Comment, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty]
(defendant's facilities to gather evidence before trial "are usually meager especially when compared
to those of the state"); Note, Toward A Constitutional Right To An Adequate Police Investigation: A
Step Beyond Brady, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 835 (1978) (noting imbalance in resources). Professor
Nakell describes several of the tools that give the prosecutor a decided advantage in obtaining infor-
mation: (1) because the police often arrive on the scene of a crime promptly, they can begin gather-
ing evidence immediately; (2) the prosecution has available trained and experienced personnel,
laboratory and technical facilities, accumulated intelligence, and cooperation from other law en-
forcement agents; (3) the prosecution usually has the cooperation of citizens in obtaining evidence
and acquiring witnesses; (4) the prosecution can also use several pretrial procedures to gather infor-
mation, including grand jury investigations, coronor inquests, and various means of questioning the
accused. Nakell, Criminal Discovery For The Defense And The Prosecution-The Developing Consti-
tutional Considerations, 50 N.C.L. REv. 437, 439-442 (1972).
3. One study conducted in 1972-73 found that 65% of criminal felony defendants were indi-
gent. NATIONAL DEFENDER SURVEY, NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, THE OTHER
FACE OF JUSTICE 83, Table 117 (1973). Counsel for an indigent defendant usually cannot obtain
expert or investigative assistance without permisssion from the court. See, eg., State v. Williams,
263 S.C. 290, 210 S.E.2d 298 (1974) (interpreting a statute providing for the services of medical
experts to indigent defendants as entitling defendants to assistance only when a showing is made that
it is reasonably necessary for proper defense); 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(2) (1982) (counsel must receive
prior authorization of court for expenditures exceeding $150 and expenses reasonably incurred);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-454 (1981) (giving the court discretion to approve a fee for supporting serv-
ices); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-207(b) (Supp. 1986) (providing that an indigent defendant in a
capital case may receive investigative or expert services only if the court determines in an ex parte
hearing that the services are necessary to protect the defendant's constitutional rights); see Annota-
tion, Right of Indigent Defendant in Criminal Case to Aid of State by Appointment of Investigator or
Expert, 34 A.L.R.3d 1256 (1970).
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each side can keep much of their potential evidence hidden from the other until
trial.4
Because of this inequality in resources and the prosecutor's role as the rep-
resentative of the state, our legal system imposes special responsibilities on the
prosecutor. Although all lawyers are officers of the court, most owe primary
loyalty to their clients. 5 A prosecutor, who has no individual client, has differ-
ent obligations. The prosecutor's role as an advocate is tempered by an obliga-
tion of fairness, a duty to ensure that each trial results in an accurate
determination of guilt and punishment. 6 At the very core of this duty are the
4. Civil discovery requires total, mutual disclosure of each party's evidence and is based on the
belief that "[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to
proper litigation." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (au-
thorizing discovery of "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action"). Traditionally, little if any discovery was available to the criminal defendant.
Note, Defendant Access to Prosecution Witness Statements in Federal and State Criminal Cases, 61
WASH. U.L.Q. 471, 473 (1983).
Although the American Bar Association (ABA) has called for essentially open-file discovery,
see 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 11-2.1 (2d ed. 1980), most discovery by crimi-
nal defendants is still far more limited. For instance, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 pro-
vides for discovery on request of any statement made by the defendant, defendant's prior record,
documents or tangible objects, and reports of examinations or tests. FED. R. CiuM. P. 16. The rule
does not provide for pretrial disclosure of the identity of prospective witnesses or witness statements.
See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903 (1983) (discovery statute patterned after FED. R. CRIM. P. 16);
VT. R. CRIM. P. § 16.2 (discovery statute patterned after FED. R. CRIM. P. 16); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 971. 23 (West 1985), (discovery statute patterned after FED. R. CRIM. P. 16); Note, supra, at 501-
02 (as of 1983 only 14 states provide for a right to pretrial defense access to witness statements). The
limitations on a criminal defendant's rights to pretrial discovery have been widely criticized. See,
e.g., Beatty, The Ability To Suppress Exculpatory Evidence: Let's Cut Off The Prosecutor's Hands, 17
IDAHO L. REv. 237 (1981); Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution. Sporting Event Or Quest For
Truth?, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279; Nakell, supra note 2, at 438; Norton, Criminal Discovery: Experi-
ence Under the American Bar Association Standards, 11 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 661 (1980); Comment, A
Proposal For Discovery Depositions For Criminal Cases In Illinois, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 547
(1983).
Although constitutional considerations historically have made discovery by the prosecution
from the defense even more limited, changes over the last decade have considerably expanded the
prosecutor's right to discovery. See Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial
Balance, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1567 (1986) (arguing that many of the recent expansions in the prosecu-
tores right to discovery violate the fifth and sixth amendments).
5. Ethical Consideration 5-1 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility states:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law,
solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and loyalties.
Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons
should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (1981); see also MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment 1 (1983) ("Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's
relationship to a client."). Professor Dershowitz quotes British barrister Henry Brougham in
describing the lawyer's role:
"An advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client, knows, in the discharge of that
office, but one person in the world, that client and none other. To save that client by all
expedient means-to protect that client at all hazards and costs to all others, and among
others to himself,-is the highest and most unquestioned of his duties ......
A. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE XV (1982) (quoting Henry Brougham).
6. The prosecutor's obligation of fairness is reflected in Justice Sutherland's oft-quoted state-
ment in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935):
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obliga-
tion to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite
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aforementioned rules requiring the prosecutor to disclose evidence favorable to
the defense and to correct false testimony.
Courts and commentators have written a great deal about the constitutional
rules that require prosecutors to disclose to the defense exculpatory evidence
and to take steps to correct false testimony.7 These rules, known collectively as
the Brady8 doctrine, are based on the due process clause of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments and require reversal of a defendant's conviction on a finding
that suppressed or falsified evidence was material. 9 This Article focuses not on
the constitutional doctrine, but on the related ethical rules that require a prose-
cutor to turn over exculpatory evidence and prohibit a prosecutor from present-
ing false evidence, regardless of the materiality of the evidence.
Every state has adopted Disciplinary Rules,10 based primarily on models
promulgated by the American Bar Association (ABA), that define the ethical
standards for lawyers and presumably regulate their conduct. The Disciplinary
Rules governing what can be described as "Brady-type" misconduct by prosecu-
tors fall into two categories. In the first category are rules that govern the con-
duct of all lawyers. These include general prohibitions on dishonest activity"
and specific bans on presenting false testimony.12 In the second category are
rules specifically aimed at the prosecutor, rules that require a prosecutor, in con-
trast to other lawyers, to reveal exculpatory evidence to the opponent.' 3 Taken
as a whole, the disciplinary codes 'provide a comprehensive network of prohibi-
tions that, together with the constitutional standards, outlaw Brady-type
prosecutorial misconduct.
These Disciplinary Rules, of course, can be an effective deterrent only if
they are applied with enough regularity and severity to discourage prosecutors
from committing Brady-type misconduct. To determine how effectively these
rules have been applied, an exhaustive search of the available printed sources
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so.
But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as
it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
Id. at 88; see also United States v. Peyro, 786 F.2d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 1986) (prosecutor's "special
duty as the government's agent is not to convict, but to secure justice"). This view of the
prosecutorial function is also reflected in comment I to rule 3.8 of the ABA's Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, which states: "A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not
simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the
defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evi-
dence." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 comment 1 (1983).
7. See infra sources cited in note 144; notes 67-85 and accompanying text.
8. The doctrine derives its name from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the materiality requirements, see infra notes 65-86 and accompanying
text.
10. See infra notes 87-123 and accompanying text. Because these rules serve both as standards
for imposing discipline and as ethical guidelines, they can accurately be described as both Ethical
Rules and Disciplinary Rules, and this Article uses the terms interchangeably.
11. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
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was conducted. 14 To supplement this research, the lawyer disciplinary bodies in
each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia were surveyed. The results
of this research demonstrate that despite the universal adoption by the states of
Disciplinary Rules prohibiting prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evi-
dence and falsification of evidence,15 and despite numerous reported cases show-
ing violations of these rules, 16 disciplinary charges have been brought
infrequently and meaningful sanctions rarely applied. 17 The result is a discipli-
nary system that, on its face, appears to be a deterrent to prosecutorial miscon-
duct, but which has had its salutary impact seriously weakened by a failure of
enforcement. Because the other available sanctions for Brady-type misconduct,
such as removal from office or contempt citations, are rarely if ever used,18 and
because the development of strict materiality standards has lessened the chance
that a conviction will be reversed because of this misconduct, at present insuffi-
cient incentive exists for a prosecutor to refrain from Brady-type misconduct.
This Article concludes with three specific recommendations to correct this
problem. First, it suggests that instead of relying solely on complaints from
individuals, bar disciplinary bodies should also review reported cases and initiate
disciplinary proceedings whenever the opinions suggest possible Brady-type mis-
conduct. Second, the bar disciplinary bodies and the courts reviewing the deci-
sions of these bodies need to sanction Brady-type misconduct more severely.
Last, the courts should adopt a bad-faith standard in Brady cases and should
reverse a defendant's conviction whenever a prosecutor has intentionally sup-
pressed exculpatory evidence or presented false evidence.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
This Article does not suggest that the level of integrity of prosecutors is any
different from that of other lawyers. Most prosecutors undoubtedly take their
ethical responsibilities seriously, as evidenced by the cases in which prosecutors,
on detecting perjury or discovering exculpatory evidence, immediately make dis-
closure to the defense. 19 There are, however, enough reported cases containing
strong evidence of intentional prosecutorial withholding of exculpatory evidence
and presentation of false evidence to demonstrate that this kind of misconduct
occurs frequently enough to generate considerable concern about devising an
effective remedy.
Not every reported case in which a defendant complains of prosecutorial
suppression or falsification of evidence contains evidence of prosecutorial ethical
14. See infra notes 139-146.
15. See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 19-52 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 150-231 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
19. See, eg., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (on discovering new evidence after trial
that was favorable to defendant, prosecutor immediately informed Governor); United States v.
Rosetti, 768 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1985) (on learning that witness had committed perjury, prosecuting
attorney immediately informed court); United States v. Dupry, 760 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1985) (prose-
cutor acted in good faith when prompt disclosure was made on discovery of document favorable to
defendant).
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violations. Many claims turn out to be baseless. 20 Others involve constitutional
violations that may not be ethical violations, such as cases in which the prosecu-
tor did not personally know of the falsity of the evidence or the existence of the
suppressed evidence, 2 1 or in which the suppressed evidence was only arguably
exculpatory, thus lessening the chance that the prosecutor intentionally violated
his or her ethical responsibilities. 22 Even disregarding these categories of cases,
however, a disturbingly large number of published opinions indicate that prose-
cutors knowingly presented false evidence or deliberately suppressed unques-
tionably exculpatory evidence.
The most prominent of these are four Supreme Court cases, Miller v.
Pate,2 3 Alcorta v. Texas,24 Brady v. Maryland,25 and Napue v. Illinois.26 In
Miller27 the prosecutors misled the jury by representing that stains on a pair of
shorts alleged to be defendant's were comprised of the victim's blood when in
fact the prosecutors knew that the stains were mostly paint.
Defendant in Alcorta was convicted of murder with malice and sentenced to
death for stabbing and killing his wife. He admitted killing his wife, but claimed
he lacked malice because he killed her after finding her kissing a Mr. Castilleja.
Alcorta thus claimed that he was guilty only of a lesser degree of murder.
28
Castilleja was the only eyewitness to the killing. He testified for the prosecution
and claimed he had only a casual friendship with Mrs. Alcorta. The prosecutor
concluded Castilleja's direct testimony with the following colloquy:
Q. Natividad [Castilleja], were you in love with Herlinda [Mrs.
Alcorta]?
A. No.
20. See, eg., Potts v. State, 241 Ga. 67, 243 S.E.2d 510 (1978) (defendant's claim that prosecu-
tor failed to disclose that witness was negotiating a lighter sentence in exchange for testimony was
without any basis), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1386 (1986); Parker v. State, 145 Ga. App. 205, 243
S.E.2d 580 (1978) (defendant's claim that prosecution failed to disclose allegedly exculpatory evi-
dence was without merit).
21. See, eg., United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3378 n.4 (1985) (prosecutor did not know
of contracts between Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms agents and witnesses promising
payment in return for testimony); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (prosecutor at defend-
ant's trial did not know that other prosecutor in office had promised witness immunity in exchange
for testimony); Barbee v. Warden of Md. Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964) (prosecutor
unaware of police department ballistics reports exculpating defendant). For a discussion of the re-
quirement that an ethical violation is not usually committed unless the prosecutor acts knowingly,
see infra note 113.
22. See, eg., State v. Connell, 478 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Johnson v. State, 427
So. 2d 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1048 (1983); State v. Bartholomew, 98
Wash. 2d 173, 654 P.2d 1170 (1982), cerL denied, 463 U.S. 1212 (1983).
23. 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
24. 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (per curiam).
25. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
26. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
27. For a detailed discussion of Miller, see infra notes 150-63 and accompanying text.
28. Alcorta, 355 U.S. at 29. Alcorta relied on Texas statutes that allowed for a conviction of
murder without malice, with a maximum punishment of five years imprisonment, on finding that a
defendant killed "under the influence of a 'sudden passion arising from an adequate cause ... as
would commonly produce a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary
temper sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection .... Id. (quoting TEx. PENAL
CODE ANN. Arts. 1257a, 1257b & 1257c (Vernon 1948)).
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Q. Was she in love with you?
A. No.
Q. Had you ever talked about love?
A. No.
Q. Had you ever had any dates with her other than to take her home?
A. No. Well, just when I brought her from there.
Q. Just when you brought her from work?
A. Yes.
29
Castilleja later testified at a post-conviction hearing that he had been having
an affair with Mrs. Alcorta and had engaged in sexual intercourse with her five
or six times. Both Castilleja and the prosecutor testified at this hearing that the
prosecutor knew about this and had told Castilleja to withhold this information
unless specifically asked about it. The prosecutor also admitted purposefully
leaving this information out of a written statement taken from Castilleja that
was shown to the defense.
30
The issue in Brady involved evidence relevant only to the determination
whether defendant would receive life in prison or the death sentence for a mur-
der committed during the course of a robbery. Brady admitted that he had par-
ticipated in the robbery and that the victim was killed during the robbery, thus
conceding he was guilty of murder under the felony murder rule. Brady also
testified, however, that he did not kill the victim, but that his codefendant Boblit
did. Brady's attorney argued this circumstance to the jury, who under Mary-
land law at the time could, at its discretion, set the punishment at either life
imprisonment or death.
Prior to trial, Brady's attorney asked to see Boblit's confessions. The prose-
cutor showed him two confessions, both of which identified Brady as the killer.
3 1
After Brady was sentenced to death Boblit was brought to trial. At this trial the
prosecutor attempted to obtain the death penalty for Boblit by introducing a
third confession in which Boblit had admitted killing the victim himself.
32
Napue concerned evidence of intentional presentation of perjured testi-
mony. Napue's conviction of murder was based largely on the testimony of an
accomplice.33 The accomplice, who already had been convicted of the murder,
29. Id. at 30.
30. Id. at 31-32. The Supreme Court, although not finding that Castilleja had perjured himself,
reversed the conviction because Castilleja's testimony had given the jury a "false impression" about
Castilleja's relationship with Mrs. Alcorta. The true facts about this relationship not only would
have impeached Castilleja's testimony, but also would have corroborated Alcorta's claim that he had
seen the couple embracing on the night of the murder. Id.
31. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.
32. See Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 426, 174 A.2d 167, 169 (1961), aff'd, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
The prosecutor could not have failed to appreciate the significance of the third statement because he
knew before Brady's trial that Brady was relying'solely on the hope that the jury would not sentence
him to death if it believed his testimony that Boblit did the killing. Id. The Supreme Court did state
that the prosecutor's actions were "not 'the result of guile' to use the words of the Court of Ap-
peals." Brady, 373 U.S. at 88 (quoting Brady, 226 Md. at 427, 174 A.2d at 169). The Maryland
Court of Appeals never actually said that the prosecutor's actions were not "the result of guile," but
only that "the appellant here does not contend that failure to produce Boblit's statement in issue was
the result of guile." Brady, 226 Md. at 427, 174 A.2d at 169.
33. Napue, 360 U.S. at 266. The murder took place in 1938 during a robbery in a cocktail
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testified on cross-examination that "ain't nobody promised me anything" for his
testimony.3 4 On redirect, the prosecutor asked, "'Have I promised you that I
would recommend any reduction of sentence to anybody?'" The witness an-
swered, "'You did not.' ",35 After Napue's conviction the same prosecutor, now
a private attorney, filed a coram nobis petition seeking a reduction of the accom-
plice's sentence in which he admitted that before Napue's trial he had promised
the accomplice that he would recommend such a reduction if he would testify
against Napue.
36
Not surprisingly, these Supreme Court cases represent a much wider pat-
tern of Brady-type misconduct than reflected in state and lower federal court
decisions. 37 In some cases the prosecutors concealed evidence that another sus-
pect actually committed the crime,38 in others the prosecutors concealed or
presented false testimony about physical evidence. 39 There are cases in which
lounge. One defendant was convicted and executed. A second defendant, Hamer, was convicted
and sentenced to 199 years in prison. Napue and a fourth defendant, Webb, were arrested some
years later. Hamer testified against Napue and Webb, and they each received 199 year sentences.
Id. at 266-67.
34. Id. at 267 n.2.
35. Id. at 271 (quoting trial court testimony of the witness).
36. Id. at 266 n.1. Napue, upon learning of the coram nobis petition, filed a post-conviction
motion challenging his conviction because of the prosecutor's knowing use of false testimony. At the
hearing on this motion the former prosecutor claimed that he may have "used some language that
[he] should not have used" in the coram nobis petition and that he actually had promised to help
Hamer only if Hamer's story about being a reluctant participant in the robbery turned out to be true.
The court hearing the motion accepted this testimony and denied Napue relief. See id. at 267. The
Illinois Supreme Court disagreed and found that the prosecutor had promised to help Hamer in
return for his testimony, but affirmed the denial of relief because Hamer had admitted that a public
defender was "trying to get something did" for him in return for his testimony. Id. at 268. When
appearing before the United States Supreme Court the State did not contest the finding that a prom-
ise had been made, and a unanimous Court reversed Napue's conviction after finding that the testi-
mony about the public defender did not vitiate the prejudice caused by the false testimony
concerning the agreement with the prosecutor. Id. at 267, 270-71.
37. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). Mooney is not included in the textual discus-
sion because the Supreme Court never ruled on the merits of the allegations of prosecutorial miscon-
duct. Instead, it dismissed the habeas corpus petition because Mooney had not exhausted his state
remedies. Independent investigation, however, showed that the prosecutors had encouraged every
one of the state's witnesses to lie and had suppressed highly exculpatory evidence. See R. FROST,
THE MOONEY CASE (1968); Comment, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty, supra note 2, at 137 &
nn.3, 7.
38. See, e.g., Cannon v. Alabama, 558 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1977) (prosecutor concealed exist-
ence of eyewitness who identified someone other than defendant); Wilkinson v. Ellis, 484 F. Supp.
1072 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (prosecutor destroyed third party's tape-recorded confession to committing the
offense); Application of Kapatos, 208 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (prosecutor concealed evidence
that eyewitness had seen two persons other than defendant run to a car near the place and time of
the killing); Nelson v. State, 59 Wis. 2d 474, 208 N.W.2d 410 (1973) (accomplice/witness testified at
trial that defendant shot victim; prosecutor suppressed evidence of witness' confession to cellmate
that he had shot victim himself).
39. See, eg., United States v. Badalamente, 507 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1974) (suppression of letters
written by key government witness claiming coercion by government), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 911
(1975); United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952) (suppression of bullet and
ballistics report that showed police, not defendant, killed victim); People v. Walker, 180 Colo. 184,
504 P.2d 1098 (1973) (prosecutor suppressed deceased's gun and ballistics report that supported
defendant's self-defense claim); People v. Loftis, 55 Ill. App. 3d 456, 370 N.E.2d 1160 (1977) (rape
victim "testified defendant ripped her clothes; prosecutor concealed unripped clothing); People v.
Wisniewski, 8 Ill. App. 3d 768, 290 N.E.2d 414 (1972) (defendant claimed he killed victim after
victim struck him with a pipe; prosecutor suppressed pipe found at scene); Arline v. State, 156 Ind.
App. 95, 294 N.E.2d 840 (1973) (prosecutor suppressed knife that supported defendant's self-defense
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the exculpatory or false evidence related to prior inconsistent statements of gov-
ernment witnesses4° and other cases in which psychiatric evidence that excul-
pated the defendant was suppressed.4 1 The nature of what was suppressed or
falsified obviously depends on the facts of each case.4 2
One pattern often repeated is that exemplified by the facts of Napue-the
intentional concealment of deals prosecutors made with prosecution witnesses to
procure their testimony 43 If the defense attorney never specifically asks the
claim); Commonwealth v. Lam Hue To, 391 Mass. 301, 461 N.E.2d 776 (1984) (prosecutor con-
cealed existence of one knife and misled defense attorney about facts surrounding discovery of sec-
ond knife; knives supported self-defense claim); State v. Thompson, 396 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. 1965)
(prosecutor suppressed shells found at scene that supported defendant's claim that he did not fire
gun).
40. See, eg., Lindsey v. King, 769 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir.) (suppression of prior statement by
eyewitness, who positively identified defendant at trial, that he could not identify perpetrator of
murder), reh'g denied, 775 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1985); Chavis v. North Carolina, 637 F.2d 213 (4th
Cir. 1980) (prior inconsistent statement of important government witness); United States v. Ander-
son, 574 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1978) (prior statement showing witness' participation in crime); Davis
v. Heyd, 479 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1973) (prior inconsistent statements of witness that supported de-
fendant's accidental killing defense); Powell v. Wiman, 287 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1961) (prior inconsis-
tent statement of accomplice who testified for State); State v. Cohane, 193 Conn. 474, 479 A.2d 763
(1984) (inconsistent prior statement of key eyewitness), cert denied, 469 U.S. 900 (1984);
Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 576 P.2d 1052 (1978) (victim's prior statement admitting
perjury at preliminary hearing); People v. Sumner, 43 Ill. 2d 228, 252 N.E.2d 534 (1969) (inconsis-
tent statements of two witnesses).
41. See, e.g., Ashly v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963) (suppression of evidence that both
defendants were legally incompetent to stand trial); Powell v. Wiman, 287 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1961)
(evidence of mental illness of key witness, including three different hospitalizations in mental institu-
tions); Wallace v. State, 88 Nev. 549, 501 P.2d 1036 (1972) (psychiatric report revealing defendant's
mental illness that was relevant both to voluntariness of confession and to degree of guilt).
42. See, eg., Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334 (10th Cir.) (prosecutor withheld reports relevant
to mitigating and aggravating circumstances in a capital case), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 1090 (1984);
United States v. McElroy, 697 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1982) (prosecutor concealed police report that
showed defendant had invoked his Miranda rights and misled defense attorney about contents of
report); Perkins v. Lefevre, 691 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1982) (witness testified that criminal record in-
volved only parking violation; even after specific request for victim's record prosecutor concealed
that witness had four prior felony convictions); United States v. Iverson, 637 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (prosecutor failed to correct witness' false testimony that she had not yet been sentenced);
Lockett v. Blackburn, 571 F.2d 309 (5th Cir.) (prosecutors hid eyewitness who would have testified
favorably for defendant), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 873 (1978); United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455
(9th Cir. 1972) (suppression of evidence of police officer's observations supporting defendant's theory
of defense); United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969) (prosecutor suppressed evidence of
pretrial hypnosis of principal witness); Hanric v. Bailey, 386 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1967) (prosecutor
suppressed evidence and allowed false testimony about condition of victim's shirt); United States ex
rel. Butler v. Maroney, 319 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1963) (prosecutor suppressed statement of eyewitness
that defendant and victim engaged in a struggle before killing); Anderson v. State, 542 F. Supp. 725
(D.S.C. 1982) (exculpatory autopsy report suppressed); Knight v. State, 478 So. 2d 332 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1985) (prosecutor suppressed expert's report that showed defendant could not have been at-
tacker who smoked cigarettes in victim's home); In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525, 487 P.2d 1234, 96
Cal. Rptr. 594 (1971) (defendant convicted of kidnapping and sexual offenses claimed that victim
and her husband consented; prosecutor suppressed evidence of husband's felony conviction and juve-
nile conviction for a sexual offense); People v. Murdock, 39 Ill. 2d 553, 237 N.E.2d 442 (1968)
(prosecutor suppressed evidence of unlocked door in victim's home that supported defendant's de-
fense); People v. De Stefano, 30 Ill. App. 3d 935, 332 N.E.2d 626 (prosecutor concealed evidence
that before murder police had beaten victim and threatened to kill him), cerL denied, 404 U.S. 957
(1975); State v. Perkins, 423 So. 2d 1103 (La. 1982) (prosecutor suppressed statement made by non-
testifying eyewitness that corroborated defendant's defense); Hall v. State, 650 P.2d 893 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1982) (prosecutor failed to correct false testimony of witness, who was also a suspect, that he
did not know murder victim); Commonwealth v. Wallace, 500 Pa. 270,455 A.2d 1187 (1983) (prose-
cutor failed to correct false testimony concerning background of chief government witness).
43. One reason so many reported cases have involved the concealment of deals made with
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witness about agreements with the government, the misconduct consists of con-
cealing exculpatory evidence. 44 If defense counsel asks and the witness denies
the existence of any inducements, the prosecutor is guilty of presenting or failing
to correct false or perjured testimony.
45
There are reported cases in which the prosecutor advised a witness to testify
falsely, 46 and others in which the falsification or suppression continued even
after a specific request for the evidence by the defendant. 47 In some cases the
prosecutors further exploited their misconduct by relying on the false impression
created by their suppression or falsification in argument to the judge or jury.48
This Article does not attempt to catalog all of the reported cases that con-
tain evidence of intentional prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence or
prosecutorial presentation of false evidence. 49 In addition to the reported cases,
a large number of cases undoubtedly occur in which the suppression or falsifica-
tion is never discovered. Once a trial is over most defendants no longer have
counsel actively seeking exculpatory evidence, and most witnesses are effectively
unavailable to the defense. Thus, the occasions when defendants do find out
about suppressed or falsified evidence usually result from fortuitous
prosecution witnesses is that the making of such agreements is a widespread practice, necessitated by
the exigencies of criminal prosecutions. It is also likely, however, that many of these cases come to
light because the prosecutor, as in Napue, has to take some public action to consummate the agree-
ment, thus increasing the chances that the defendant will learn of the hidden agreement.
44. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marzeno v. Gengler, 574 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1978); United
States v. McCrane, 547 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1976).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Barham, 595 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1002
(1983); Campbell v. Reed, 594 F.2d 4 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Sanfilippo, 564 F.2d 176 (5th
Cir. 1977); Boone v. Paderick, 541 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977);
United States v. Pope, 529 F.2d 112 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Gerard, 491 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir.
1974); Sellers v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 767 (W.D.N.C. 1983); see also Commonwealth v. Hallo-
well, 477 Pa. 232, 383 A.2d 909 (1978) (former prosecutor misled court by testifying under oath that
no deal had been made with witness).
46. See, e.g., Hilliard v. Williams, 516 F.2d 1344 (6th Cir. 1975) (prosecutor advised investiga-
tive agent not to mention a lab report that showed stains on defendant's clothing to be varnish or
paint and not blood), vacated, 424 U.S. 961 (1976); Turner v. Ward, 321 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1963)
(prosecutor told physician who examined victim to conceal that examination did not show evidence
of intercourse).
47. See, eg., Lindsey v. King, 769 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 775 F.2d 301 (5th Cir.
1985); Chancey v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1090 (1984); United
States v. McElroy, 697 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1982); Perkins v. Lefevre, 691 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1982);
Chavis v. North Carolina, 637 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. McCrane, 547 F.2d 204 (3d
Cir. 1976); Anderson v. South Carolina, 542 F. Supp. 725 (D.S.C. 1982); Knight v. State, 478 So. 2d
332 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985); State v. Perkins, 423 So. 2d 1103 (La. 1982); Commonwealth v. Wal-
lace, 500 Pa. 270, 455 A.2d 1187 (1983).
48. United States v. Sanfilippo, 564 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1977); Boone v. Paderick, 541 F.2d 447
(4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977); United States v. Gerard, 491 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir.
1974); Sellers v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 767 (W.D.N.C. 1983); People v. Walker, 180 Colo. 184,
504 P.2d 1098 (1973); State v. Cohane, 193 Conn. 474, 479 A.2d 763, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990
(1984); People v. Wisniewski, 8 Ill. App. 3d 768, 290 N.E.2d 414 (1972); Arline v. State, 156 Ind.
App. 95, 294 N.E.2d 840 (1973); State v. Thompson, 396 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. 1965).
49. For discussions of other reported cases involving Brady violations, see Comment,
Prosecutorial Misconduct: A National Survey, 21 DE PAUL L. REv. 422 (1971); Annotation, With-
holding or Suppression of Evidence by Prosecution in Criminal Case as Vitiating Conviction, 34
A.L.R.3d 16 (1970); Annotation, Right of Accused in State Courts to Inspection or Disclosure of
Evidence in Possession of Prosecution, 7 A.L.R.3d 8, 32-36 (1966); see also Annotation, Right of
Accused to Inspection or Disclosure of Evidence in Possession of Prosecutors, 52 A.L.R. 207 (1928)
(pre-Brady cases involving defendants' rights to discovery).
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circumstances.
50
Significantly, the opinions in a large number of reported cases suggest that
the prosecutor violated one or more Disciplinary Rules. 5 1 This is not to say the
prosecutor in each of these cases was, in fact, guilty of ethical violations. Guilt
is a matter to be determined by the disciplinary bodies and reviewing courts after
an investigation in each case.: 2 The cases do demonstrate, nevertheless, that
Brady-type prosecutorial misconduct is a recurring problem and that the disci-
plinary bodies of the various jurisdictions have had numerous opportunities to
apply the Disciplinary Rules that forbid this type of misconduct.
III. LEGAL SANCTIONS FOR BRADY-TYPE MISCONDUCT
To appreciate the significance of the Disciplinary Rules that prohibit
Brady-type misconduct, it is helpful to understand the degree to which other
methods have been used to punish such behavior. Theoretically a number of
sanctions are available to deter prosecutors who might consider suppressing ex-
culpatory evidence or presenting false evidence. The later discovery of the mis-
conduct might result in a reversal of the convictions. The prosecutor could be
sanctioned by a contempt citation,5 3 criminal prosecution,5 4 or removal from
office.55 Because these latter sanctions are rarely, if ever, applied to Brady-type
misconduct, however, they have little deterrent value.
56
50. See, eg., Napue, 360 U.S. 264 (defendant learned of deal when codefendant filed for post-
conviction relief); Davis v. Heyd, 350 F. Supp. 958, 961 (E.D. La. 1972) (defense counsel learned of
exculpatory written statements when state answered defendant's motion for a new trial in 1968),
rev'd, 479 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1973); Brady, 226 Md. at 423, 194 A.2d at 169 (defense learned of
codefendant's exculpatory confession when prosecutor attempted to use it at codefendant's trial);
Commonwealth v. Lam Hue To, 391 Mass. 301, 461 N.E.2d 776 (1984) (defense counsel learned
that prosecutor had misled him about existence of exculpatory evidence during cross-examination of
witness); see also Fulford v. Maggio, 692 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1982) (defense attorney discovered
exculpatory police report and third party confession from informant at police department), rev'd,
462 U.S. 11, reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1236 (1983).
51. For a detailed discussion of these Disciplinary Rules, see infra notes 87-116 and accompa-
nying text.
52. For a discussion of the procedures used to discipline lawyers, see infra notes 124-38 and
accompanying text.
53. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 900.04 (West 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:10-1 (West 1952);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8-5 (1985).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982) provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully sub-
jects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being
an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of
citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
55. See, eg., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 106.220 (Vernon 1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 91 (West
1962); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-3-240 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
56. No cases could be found in which a prosecutor was found in contempt for Brady-type
misconduct. Professor Alschuler also has found that there does not appear to be a single case in
which a prosecutor had been found in contempt for courtroom misconduct. Alschuler, Courtroom
Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEx. L. REV. 629, 673-74 (1972). Because Brady-
type misconduct usually is not discovered until after the trial is over, a court is even less likely to use
its contempt power in this situation than in a case in which the misconduct occurs in the judge's
presence. In the one case found in which a trial court did seek sanctions for Brady-type misconduct,
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Prosecutors historically have also enjoyed absolute immunity, guaranteed
by common law or statutory provisions, from civil liability for misconduct con-
nected to their prosecutorial function.5 7 In 1976, in Imbler v. Pachtman,58 the
Supreme Court extended to prosecutors similar immunity from suits brought
against them under title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code,59 alleging
the suppression of exculpatory evidence or the presentation of false evidenceY°
This decision has eliminated potential civil liability as a deterrent.
The Supreme Court in Imbler based its decision mainly on the common-law
immunity granted prosecutors and the potential harm to the criminal justice
system if equivalent immunity were not afforded under section 1983.61 Notably,
the Court also relied on the existence of Disciplinary Rules, which supposedly
act to control prosectitorial misconduct, as a responsible alternative to actions
for damages. The Court noted the prosecutor's "unique" amenability to profes-
the trial judge referred the matter to the state bar instead of using his contempt power. See United
States v. Kelly, 543 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Mass. 1982). For a discussion of Kelly, see infra notes 179-93
and accompanying text.
Only one case was found in which a prosecutor was criminally convicted for suppressing excul-
patory evidence. See Brophy v. Committee on Professional Standards, 83 A.D.2d 975, 442 N.Y.S.2d
818 (1981). For a discussion of Brophy, see infra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
No cases could be found in which a prosecutor was removed from office for falsifying or sup-
pressing exculpatory evidence. There is, however, presently pending in Minnesota a petition seeking
removal of a prosecutor for numerous acts of misconduct, including the suppression of exculpatory
evidence, allegedly committed in relation to a highly publicized child sexual-abuse case. See State of
Minnesota, Commission Established by Executive Order No. 85-10 Concerning Kathleen Morris,
Scott County Attorney-Report to Governor Rudy Perpich, 8-15 (unpublished), Given the reluc-
tance of courts and disciplinary bodies to impose more than minor sanctions for Brady-type miscon-
duct, see infra notes 150-231 and accompanying text, it is extremely unlikely that the more severe
sanctions of criminal prosecution or removal from office will ever be credible deterrents.
57. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 132 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895 comment c (1977); Note, Immunizing the Investigating Pros-
ecutor: Should the Dishonest Go Free or the Honest Defend, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 1110, 1112-14
(1980). This absolute immunity stems from a prosecutor's quasi-judicial capacity in performing his
or her official functions. Creelman v. Svenning, 67 Wash. 2d 882, 883, 410 P.2d 606, 607 (1966). A
prosecutor usually enjoys only qualified immunity for activities deemed extraneous to this quasi-
judicial function. Mancini v. Lester, 630 F.2d 990 (3d Cir. 1980); Note, supra, at 1125-26.
58. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
59. Section 1983 of the United States Code title 42, which was originally § I of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
60. Imbler was convicted and sentenced to death for murder. After the conviction Pachtman,
who had prosecuted Imbler, wrote a letter to the Governor of California describing evidence he had
discovered during a post-trial investigation that corroborated Imbler's alibi and impeached the
State's prime witness. Thereafter, Imbler filed a post-conviction motion. Imbler's conviction was
eventually reversed and he was freed when the State decided not to retry him. Only then did Imbler
file suit against Pachtman and a number of police officers seeking redress for violating his constitu-
tional rights by suppressing exculpatory evidence. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 410-15.
61. Id. at 421-28. The Court found that anything less than absolute immunity would "cause a
deflection of the prosecutor's energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade
his decisions instead of exercising the independence ofjudgment required by his public trust." Id. at
423.
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sional discipline,62 which it described in a later case as the "comparatively well
developed and pervasive mechanism" of disciplinary sanctions available to pun-
ish prosecutors.
63
Therefore, besides disciplinary sanctions, the only potential deterrent to
Brady-type misconduct is the prospect that the conviction of the defendant will
be reversed. It is probably safe to assume that prosecutors would prefer not to
have a conviction reversed. Not only does a retrial take a lot of time, expense,
and effort, but it also gives the defendant another chance to gain an acquittal.
When prosecutorial misconduct causes the reversal, the prosecutor is further
subject to embarrassment and criticism from the legal profession. 64
Unfortunately, the deterrent effect of a potential reversal has been under-
mined by the Supreme Court's development of strict materiality requirements in
Brady cases. Materiality has a special meaning in the Brady due process con-
text, for to be material in a Brady case false or suppressed evidence must be of
sufficient importance that, when viewed in light of all of the evidence in the case,
its presence or absence would affect the outcome of the case.65 In this sense the
concept of materiality in a Brady case is equivalent to the concepts of prejudice
or harmless error courts employ in other areas of criminal law. 66 Only if suffi-
cient prejudice or harm to the defense arises from the absence of the undisclosed
evidence or from the presence of the false evidence will the suppressed or false
evidence be considered material and the conviction reversed.
The earliest Supreme Court Brady cases67 did not discuss materiality.
62. The Court noted: "Moreover, a prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials whose
acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by an
association of his peers." Id. at 429.
63. Malley v. Briggs, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1097 n.5 (1986). In Malley the Supreme Court refused to
extend absolute immunity to police officers sued under § 1983.
64. See, ag., Alschuler, supra note 56, at 646-47. For an extensive discussion of the effective-
ness of appellate reversal as a deterrent in this area, see infra notes 257-66 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 67-85 and accompanying text. In non-Brady cases evidence usually does not
have to be outcome-determinative to be material. "Materiality ordinarily relates to the pertinency of
offered evidence to the issue in dispute or to the issue of credibility." Ladd, Objections, Motions and
Foundation Testimony, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 543, 547 (1958); see, eg., State v. Clay, 213 N.W.2d 473,
477 (Iowa 1973); see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 541 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) ("Mate-
riality looks to the relation between the propositions for which the evidence is offered and the issues
in the case. If the evidence is offered to help prove a proposition which is not a matter in issue, the
evidence is immaterial.").
66. Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion in United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985),
confirms the equivalency of the materiality standards in Brady cases with harmless error and preju-
dice tests. He noted that "the standard of review applicable to the knowing use of perjured testi-
mony is equivalent to the [Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)] harmless error standard,"
Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3382 n.9, and that the materiality standard applicable to nondisclosure of
exculpatory evidence is identical to the test for prejudice formulated in Strickland v. Washington,
104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3383-84.
67. The Supreme Court first applied the due process clause in this area in Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103 (1935) (per curiam), in which the Court held that a prosecutor's knowing use of per-
jured testimony could violate due process. Due process, the Mooney Court stated,
is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a State
has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a
means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury
by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a State to
procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the rudi-
mentary demands ofjustice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation.
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Mooney v. Holohan68 and Pyle v. Kansas69 were decided in a procedural posture
that made the issue irrelevant. 70 In Miller v. Pate7 1 and Alcorta v. Texas7 2 there
was evidence of egregious prosecutorial misconduct, and the Court simply re-
versed the convictions after finding a due process violation without discussing
materiality. 73 Brady introduced the notion of materiality by holding that due
process is violated if the suppressed evidence is "material either to guilt or pun-
ishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution," but provided
no further definition for what the court meant by "material."'74
Only in Napue v. Illinois75 and Giglio v. United States,76 in which the Court
reversed convictions because of perjury that concealed the existence of deals
made with prosecution witnesses, did the Court refer at all to the quantum of
prejudice that must be present before a court could find a due process violation.
In both cases, however, the Court failed to discuss this question extensively.
Instead, it reversed both convictions after finding in Napue that the false testi-
mony "may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial"77 and in Giglio that
it " 'in any reasonable likelihood [could] have affected the judgment of the
Id. at 112.
Since Mooney the Supreme Court has continually expanded its prohibition on the knowing use
of perjured testimony. The Court has held that due process can be violated when the testimony
leaves the jury with a "false impression," whether or not perjury was committed. Alcorta, 355 U.S.
28. It has prohibited the use of false evidence relevant only to a witness' credibility, United States v.
Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Napue, 360 U.S. 264,
and has imputed one prosecutor's knowledge of the falsity of the evidence to other prosecutors in the
same office, Giglio, 405 U.S. at 150 ("prosecutor's office is an entity"). In Brady the Court held that
due process can be violated even when there is no perjury or false testimony, if the prosecutor sup-
presses evidence that has been requested by the defense that is exculpatory in regard to either guilt or
sentencing. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), made clear that the
Brady rule also applies even when no request has been made. Due process can be violated by negli-
gent as well as intentional prosecutorial conduct, Giglio, 405 U.S. at 150, and irrespective of the good
or bad faith of the prosecutor, Brady, 373 U.S. at 83.
68. 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (per curiam).
69. 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
70. Mooney involved a request for leave to file an original writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme
Court. Despite holding that Mooney's claims, if proven, demonstrated a due process violation, the
Supreme Court denied the request because Mooney had not exhausted his state remedies by filing a
habeas petition in state court. Mooney, 294 U.S. at 115. Pyle's petition for a writ of habeas corpus
had been denied without a hearing by the Kansas courts. Finding, as in Mooney, that defendant's
petition alleged facts showing a violation of due process, the Supreme Court remanded the case for a
hearing on the allegations. Pyle, 317 U.S. at 216.
71. 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
72. 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (per curiam).
73. In Miller the Court simply stated: "More than 30 years ago this Court held that the four-
teenth amendment cannot tolerate a state criminal conviction obtained by the knowing use of false
evidence. There has been no deviation from that established principle. There can be no retreat from
that principle here." Miller, 386 U.S. at 7 (citations omitted). InAlcorta the Court noted only that
Alcorta's defense "might well have been" accepted by the jury if the witness had not been allowed to
testify falsely. Alcorta, 355 U.S. at 32.
74, Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Subsequent to Brady courts generally defined materiality to corre-
spond to a likelihood that the suppressed evidence would have affected the verdict, but differed as to
the precise effect required. Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to the Accused and Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1146 n.46 (1982).
75. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
76. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
77. Napue, 360 U.S. at 272.
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jury.' "278
It was not until the 1976 opinion in United States v. Agurs 79 that the Court
provided more substantial guidance on the meaning of the materiality require-
ment. The majority opinion in Agurs divided the prosecutorial suppression and
falsification cases into three categories. First are the cases in which the prosecu-
tor used perjured or false testimony. The Court held that these cases should be
reversed when, as in Giglio, there is "any reasonable likelihood that the false
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury."' 80 Second are cases in
which the prosecutor received a specific request from the defense for the excul-
patory evidence, but failed to turn it over. The Agurs Court defined materiality
in this situation to mean that the suppressed evidence "might have affected the
outcome of the trial."81 The majority noted also that a failure to turn over
specifically requested information would be "seldom, if ever, excusable."' 82 In
the third category are cases in which exculpatory evidence was suppressed, in
which there was no perjury or false testimony, and in which there was no spe-
cific request for the exculpatory evidence by the defense. In this situation, the
defendant is granted a new trial if the suppressed evidence "creates a reasonable
doubt that did not otherwise exist."
'8 3
The existence of a separate standard of materiality for cases in which the
defense attorney has made a specific request for the exculpatory evidence was,
however, short-lived. In United States v. Bagley84 the Court eliminated specific-
request cases as a separate category with their own standard of materiality. In-
stead, it merged this category with the no-request cases and their "reasonable
doubt that did not otherwise exist" materiality standard.8 5
As a consequence of the materiality standards, a prosecutor knows that a
decision to withhold or falsify evidence, even if discovered, will not necessarily
78. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 271).
79. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
80. Id. at 103.
81. Id. at 104.
82. Id. at 106.
83. Id. at 112. The Agurs Court included within this category cases in which the defense coun-
sel made no request or only a general request for "all Brady material" or "anything exculpatory."
Id. at 106-07.
84. 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985) (plurality opinion).
85. Id. at 3384. For a discussion of how lower courts applied theAgurs specific-request materi-
ality standard prior to Bagley, see Babcock, supra note 74, at 1148 n.56. In Bagley five Justices
seemingly voted to eliminate the separate category for specific-request cases, even though the Gov-
ernment had conceded that a materiality standard more favorable to the defense would be justified
when a specific request had been made. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3384. These five Justices were unable
to agree, however, on what significance should be given to a specific request. Justice Blackmun
found the reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist standard "sufficiently flexible" to encompass
no-request, general-request, and specific-request cases. Id. He was joined in this holding by Justices
O'Connor, White, Rehnquist, and Burger. Only Justice O'Connor, however, joined in his further
explanation that a specific request could "impair the adversary process" and affect materiality by
causing the defense to alter its preparation and presentation of the case. Id. Justice White, joined in
his concurrence by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, saw "no reason to attempt to elabo-
rate on the relevance to the inquiry of the defense's request for disclosure." Id. at 3385 (White, J.,
concurring). The response of the lower courts to Bagley's treatment of specific-request cases is dis-
cussed in Note, Specific Requests and the Prosecutorial Duty to Disclose Evidence, 1986 DUKE L.J.
892.
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result in a reversal of the conviction. This is true no matter how flagrant or
intentional the prosecutor's misconduct. The prosecutor knows that before re-
versing a conviction a reviewing court still will have to conclude, after examin-
ing all of the evidence in the case, that the absence of the suppressed evidence or
the presence of the falsified evidence had enough significance to have affected the
outcome of the trial.
As a reflection of the concern with the fairness of an individual defendant's
trial in a specific case, the materiality standards may make sense. The standards
also, however, reflect a determination that the due process clause "is not a code
of ethics for prosecutors" 8 6 and that it is not the appropriate vehicle for solving
the problem of deterring prosecutorial suppression or falsification of evidence.
In this respect, the Court's decision in Bagley to jettison the more lenient
materiality standard for specific-request cases is especially significant. If the de-
fense counsel has made no request for the exculpatory evidence, the prosecutor
can always claim that he or she did not realize that the evidence was exculpatory
or that its significance was overlooked. Once the evidence is specifically re-
quested this excuse largely disappears. It is hard to see any justification for a
prosecutor's failure to turn over requested evidence, or at least to submit the
matter to a judge for an ex parte evaluation. Failure to do either raises a strong
inference of deliberate misconduct. Therefore, by grouping the specific-request
cases with the no-request cases and their stricter materiality standard, the
Supreme Court has further undermined the deterrent potential of the due pro-
cess requirements.
IV. THE "WELL-DEVELOPED AND PERVASIVE MECHANISM"-
DISCIPLINARY RULES PROHIBITING BRADY-TYPE MISCONDUCT
This section of the Article is devoted to a discussion of the ethical rules that
apply to prosecutors who suppress exculpatory evidence or present false evi-
dence. The section examines four major ethical codes formulated by the ABA-
the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics,87 the 1969 Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (Model Code),88 the 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules),8 9 and the 1979 Standards Relating To The Administration of
86. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1984). In Mabry a unanimous Court held
that a defendant's acceptance of a prosecutor's proposed plea bargain did not create a constitutional
right to have that bargain enforced. Id.
87. For a history of the adoption of the 1908 Canons, see H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHics 23-25
(1953). By 1914, 31 states had adopted the Canons. Id. at 25. The Canons were not designed to
have statutory force, but were instead intended to be guidelines reflecting the proper standards of
conduct for the legal profession. Id. at 26-30; C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 55-56 (1986).
88. The Model Code originated with a special committee appointed by ABA President (now
Supreme Court Justice) Lewis F. Powell, Jr., in 1964. The Code was adopted by the ABA in August
of 1969. See Sutton, The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility: An Introduc-
tion, 48 TEX. L. REV. 255 (1970). The Code contains three types of provisions. The Canons are
general statements of axiomatic norms, the Disciplinary Rules are intended to be mandatory stan-
dards governing lawyer conduct, and the Ethical Considerations are aspirational statements of objec-
tives. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY preamble (1969).
89. In 1977 the President of the ABA, William B. Spann, Jr., appointed a Committee on the
Evaluation of Professional Standards. This Committee drafted the Model Rules of Professional
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Criminal Justice.90
These ethical codes represent the formal expression of the nationwide or-
ganized bar concerning the ethical duties of lawyers. Courts and bar discipli-
nary bodies have always recognized these codes as the primary standards to
guide decisionmaking in the realm of lawyer discipline,9 1 and to the extent that
they have been adopted as standards by individual jurisdictions, they constitute
the law of disciplinary regulation.
With regard to prosecutors who suppress exculpatory evidence or present
false evidence, the rules can be divided into two parts. There are rules that apply
solely to prosecutors, and there are others that apply to all lawyers, including
prosecutors.
A. Prosecutor Specific Prohibitions
Long before the Supreme Court applied the due process clause to prohibit
the prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence, the ABA adopted Canon
5 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, which reads, in pertinent part: "The
primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to
see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the secreting of witnesses
capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible." 92
Consistent with the entire Canon of Ethics, this particular passage is more hor-
tatory than mandatory, yet it establishes that as early as 1908 the bar recognized
that prosecutors had a special obligation to reveal evidence favorable to the
opponent.
The ABA expanded and strengthened the general language of Canon 5 by
adopting the Model Code of Professional Responsibility's Disciplinary Rule 7-
103(B):
A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal litigation
Conduct, which were adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in August 1983. L. PATrERSON,
LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1-4 (1982); C. WOLFRAM, supra
note 87, at 61-63. The Model Rules consist of 52 Rules, each with an accompanying explanatory
comment. They contain no Canons or Ethical Considerations.
90. The ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice were drafted by a
committee headed by Judge (later Chief Justice) Warren E. Burger. The Standards relating to the
prosecution function and the defense function were adopted initially in 1971 and as amended in
1979. For a history of the Standards, see 1 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 4,
introduction, at xx-xxix.
91. See City of Los Angeles v. Decker, 18 Cal. 3d 860, 870, 558 P.2d 545, 551, 135 Cal. Rptr.
647, 653 (1977); In re Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d 392, 396, 392 N.E.2d 1333, 1335 (1979) (Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, although not yet formally adopted by state supreme court, used as guide for
standards of professional conduct); H. DRINKER, supra note 87, at 26-30.
92. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 5 (1965). The portion of Canon 5 that deals
with the responsibilities of defense attorneys vividly demonstrates the different roles the legal profes-
sion envisions for the defense attorney and prosecutor:
It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of a person accused of crime,
regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused; otherwise innocent persons,
victims only of suspicious circumstances, might be denied proper defense. Having under-
taken such defense, the lawyer is bound, by all fair and honorable means, to present every
defense that the law of the land permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life
or liberty, but by due process of law.
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shall make timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant, or to the
defendant if he has no counsel, of the existence of evidence, known to
the prosecutor or other government lawyer, that tends to negate the
guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the
punishment.
93
Along with the inclusion of the mandatory "shall," which reflects the overall
shift from the Canons' hortatory tone to the Model Code's rule-making orienta-
tion, 94 Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) describes the obligations of the prosecutor
more explicitly than does Canon 5. Disclosure of exculpatory evidence must be
timely under Disciplinary Rule 7-103(3). 95 Canon 5 leaves open the possibility
that the prosecutor may fulfill the duty of disclosure by revealing the evidence to
the court, but Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) makes clear that the disclosure must
be made to the defense. Reflecting the developments in the due process cases,
Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) no longer limits the duty to disclose, as does Canon
5, to facts or witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the defendant.
Instead, it extends the disclosure requirement to evidence that would negate the
defendant's guilt, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment.
96
The ABA's latest formulation of the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence
is reflected in Model Rule 3.8(d), which states that the prosecutor must
make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused
or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to
the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information
known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this
93. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (1980). The Model Code
also contains Ethical Consideration 7-13, which states:
The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is
to seek justice, not merely to convict. This special duty exists because: (1) the prosecutor
represents the sovereign and therefore should use restraint in the discretionary exercise of
governmental powers, such as in the selection of cases to prosecute; (2) during trial the
prosecutor is not only an advocate but he also may make decisions normally made by an
individual client, and those affecting the public interest should be fair to all; and (3) in our
system of criminal justice the accused is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts.
With respect to evidence and witnesses, the prosecutor has responsibilities different from
those of a lawyer in private practice: the prosecutor should make timely disclosure to the
defense of available evidence, known to him, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused,
mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment. Further, a prosecutor should
not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence merely because he believes it will damage the
prosecutor's case or aid the accused.
Id. EC 7-13 (1980).
94. See supra notes 87-88.
95. The Model Code does not define what is meant by "timely." Most courts have held that
disclosure at any time prior to or during trial is timely unless the defendant can prove prejudice from
the delayed disclosure. See, eg., United States v. Holloway, 740 F.2d 1373 (6th Cir.) (disclosure of
inconsistent statements at trial not prejudicial), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1021 (1984); United States v.
Flaherty, 668 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1981) (disclosure two days prior to trial not prejudicial).
96. For an acknowledgment of the impact of the due process cases on Disciplinary Rule 7-
103(B), see ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 7-103(B) comment (1979).
Although Brady only discussed exculpatory evidence material to guilt or punishment, the earlier
decision in Alcorta, in which the Court reversed the conviction because the false evidence could have
influenced the jury not to reduce the conviction from murder with malice to murder without malice,
made clear that the due process clause is also implicated when the suppressed or falsified evidence is
material only to reduce the degree of the offense. See Alcorta, 355 U.S. at 31.
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responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal.
9 7
With the exception of the last phrase allowing a protective order,98 the
changes from Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) in Model Rule 3.8(d) seem directed
toward clearing up possible ambiguities in Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) and en-
suring full disclosure by prosecutors. Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) requires the
disclosure only of "the existence of evidence." This theoretically allows the
prosecutor merely to inform the defense that the evidence exists without actually
turning it over. Model Rule 3.8(d), by requiring the disclosure of "evidence,"
mandates that the evidence itself must be given to the defense. The requirement
in Model Rule 3.8(d) for disclosing "information" as well as evidence makes
clear that the admissibility of the exculpatory facts is irrelevant. No longer can
a prosecutor justify a decision to withhold evidence by arguing that the evidence
was inadmissible.
Similarly, the requirement of Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) for disclosure of
evidence "mitigating the degree of the offense" theoretically allows the prosecu-
tor to make a judgment whether the exculpatory evidence in his or her posses-
sion would actually result in the defendant being convicted only of a lesser crime
than the one charged. For example, under Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) a prose-
cutor could reasonably decide in a murder prosecution that evidence negating
malice, such as evidence of provocation by the deceased, would not, in the face
of other strong evidence of malice, actually reduce the offense to manslaughter.
By using the term "mitigating the offense" instead of "mitigating the degree of
the offense," Model Rule 3.8(d) eliminates this element of discretion.
Model Rule 3.8(d) also eliminates discretion with regard to the disclosure
requirements relating to sentencing. Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) requires disclo-
sure only of evidence that would "tend to reduce the punishment." Under
Model Rule 3.8(d), the prosecutor must reveal "information" as well as evi-
dence, and this information must be revealed if it is "mitigating," whether or not
it would, in the judgment of the prosecutor, be likely to reduce the punishment.
Unlike the Model Code and Model Rules, which were enacted, as their
names connote, to serve as models for adoption by the states as disciplinary
codes, the purpose of the ABA Standards is to offer guidelines for the implemen-
tation of reforms in the criminal justice system.99 Standard 3-3.1 l(a) covers the
prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence:
(a) It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor intentionally to fail to
97. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(d) (1983).
98. Although Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) has no provision for a protective order, it is hard to
imagine that a prosecutor, even under the Model Code, would violate his or her ethical responsibili-
ties if the evidence was withheld under the specific authority of a court order.
99. The ABA Standards provide as follows:
[T]he standards are not model codes or rules, and hence were not drafted in such language.
Rather, they are guidelines and recommendations intended to help criminal justice plan-
ners design a system, set goals and priorities to achieve it, and propose procedures for
adoption by the legislature, courts, and practitioners to operate and keep it viable-all
targeted toward achieving a criminal justice system that is fair, balanced, and constitution-
ally responsive to the needs of today and the future.
I STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, introduction, at xx.
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make disclosure to the defense, at the earliest feasible opportunity, of
the existence of evidence which tends to negate the guilt of the accused
as to the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the punish-
ment of the accused.l°°
The most significant difference between Standard 3-3.11(a), on the one
hand, and Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) and Model Rule 3.8(d) on the other, is the
replacement of the requirement to make "timely" disclosure with the duty to
disclose at the "earliest feasible opportunity." Standard 3-3.11(a) also does not
separately call for disclosure of evidence that mitigates the degree of the offense,
although one could read this requirement into its disclosure provision for evi-
dence that negates guilt "as to the offense charged." Otherwise, the thrust of
Standard 3-3.11(a) is identical to that of Disciplinary Rule 7-103(b) and Model
Rule 3.8(d).
Although only the ABA Standards For Criminal Justice expressly prohibit
prosecutorial presentation of false testimony, 0l1 the prosecutorial presentation
of false evidence necessarily violates the rules prohibiting the suppression of ex-
culpatory evidence. If a witness testifies falsely, and the prosecutor knows that
fact and fails to reveal it, the prosecutor is suppressing the exculpatory evidence
that would show the falsity of the witness' testimony. A prosecutor thus violates




A prosecutor is generally subject to the ethical rules applicable to other
lawyers.' 0 3 Thus, in addition to violating the rules specifically prohibiting sup-
pression of exculpatory evidence, a prosecutor who presents false testimony or
suppresses exculpatory evidence can violate a number of other ethical rules.
A prosecutor who knowingly allows a witness to testify falsely violates Dis-
100. 1 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at Standard 3-3.11(a).
101. Standard 3-5.6(a) reads: "It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor knowingly to offer
false evidence, whether by documents, tangible evidence, or the testimony of witnesses, or fail to seek
withdrawal thereof upon discovery of its falsity." Id. Standard 3-5.6(a).
102. For example, in Napue the prosecutor, by allowing the witness to testify falsely that no deal
had been made in return for his testimony, also suppressed the evidence that the deal existed. See
supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
103. Most courts have held that prosecutors may be subjected to discipline for misconduct. See,
eg., In re Bloom, 19 Cal. 3d 175, 561 P.2d 258, 137 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1977); People v. Green, 405
Mich. 273, 274 N.W.2d 448 (1979); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar v. Scanland, 475 P.2d 373 (Okla.
1970); see Annotation, Disciplinary Action Against Attorney for Misconduct Related to Official Duties
as ProsecutingAttorney, 10 A.L.R.4th 605, 613-17 (1981). In 1975 the Alabama Supreme Court held
that a district attorney could not be disciplined by the State Bar during his term of office. Simpson v.
Alabama State Bar, 294 Ala. 52, 56, 311 So. 2d 307, 310 (1975). The court reasoned that under the
Alabama State Constitution a prosecutor could be removed from office only by impeachment and
thus was not subject to any professional discipline, even a reprimand or censure. Id. at 54-57, 311
So. 2d at 308-10. The court has also extended this protection to deputy district attorneys. Watson v.
Alabama State Bar, 294 Ala. 57, 58, 311 So. 2d 311, 311-12 (1975). The Simpson court did note that
the recently adopted Alabama Code of Professional Responsibility might allow disciplining of a
prosecutor, Simpson, 294 Ala. at 56, 311 So. 2d at 310, and in 1980 the court stated that it had not
"foreclosed" application of the Code of Professional Responsibility to district attorneys, Honeycutt
v, Simpson, 388 So. 2d 990 (Ala. 1980) (per curiam).
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ciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(4), which states that a lawyer shall not "knowingly use
perjured testimony or false evidence"' 1 4 and Model Rule 3.3(a)(1), which states
that a lawyer shall not "offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false."105' If
the prosecutor takes a more active role and advises or assists the witness in
testifying falsely, the prosecutor also violates Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(6) by
"[participating] in the creation or preservation of evidence when he knows or it
is obvious that the evidence is false"'1 6 and Model Rule 3.4(b) by "counsel[ing]
or assist[ing] a witness to testify falsely." 10 7 Should the prosecutor go further
and argue the false evidence to the judge or jury, he or she has also violated
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(a)(5), which prohibits a lawyer from "knowingly
mak[ing] a false statement of law or fact '10 8 and Model Rule 3.3(a)(1), which
prohibits a lawyer from knowingly "mak[ing] a false statement of material fact
or law to a tribunal."10 9
In addition to violating the prosecutor-specific rules, a prosecutor who sup-
presses exculpatory evidence also risks falling afoul of Disciplinary Rule 7-
102(A)(3), Disciplinary Rule 7-109(A), and Model Rule 3.4(a), all of which re-
quire a lawyer to reveal that which the law requires be revealed. 110 If the sup-
pression of exculpatory evidence continues after a specific request by the defense,
the requirement of Model Rule 3.4(d) that a lawyer shall not "fail to make a
reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by
an opposing party" is implicated. 11 ' Finally, a prosecutor who suppresses excul-
104. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4) (1980).
105. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(1) (1983). Model Rule 3.3(a)(4)
also provides: "If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer
shall take reasonable remedial measures." Id. Rule 3.3(a)(4). Canon 22 of the 1908 Canons notes
that "[ilt is unprofessional and dishonorable to deal other than candidly... in the presentation of
causes." CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 22 (1965). Canon 29 states that "counsel upon
the trial of a cause in which pejury has been committed owe it to the profession and to the public to
bring the matter to the knowledge of the prosecuting authorities." Id. Canon 29; see also STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at Standard 3-5.6(a) (1986) (discussing prosecutor's
ethical responsibility with respect to presenting false evidence and suppressing other evidence).
106. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(6) (1980).
107. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(b) (1983).
108. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(5) (1980).
109. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(1) (1983).
110. Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(3) states that a lawyer shall not "conceal or knowingly fail to
disclose that which he is required by law to reveal," MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
rrY DR 7-102(A)(3) (1980), and Disciplinary Rule 7-109(A) reads: "A lawyer shall not suppress
any evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce," id. DR 7-109(A).
Model Rule 3.4(a) notes that a lawyer shall not "[u]nlawfully obstruct another party's access to
evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evi-
dentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act .... MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(a) (1983). It is questionable whether these standards
are violated in cases in which a reviewing court has concluded that the exculpatory evidence sup-
pressed was not sufficiently material to require a reversal. Justice Blackmun stated in United States
v. Bagley that there is no due process duty to disclose exculpatory evidence unless the evidence is
material. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3383. Thus, a finding of nonmnateriality means that under Discipli-
nary Rule 7-102(A)(3) the disclosure is not "required by law," and under Model Rule 3.4(a) the
concealment is not "unlawful." Disciplinary Rule 7-109(A), however, requires only an "obligation
to reveal or produce," and this obligation theoretically could be based on Disciplinary Rule 7-
103(B), which has no materiality requirement, as well as the due process clause. See MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (1980). All three of these provisions are violated
whenever a court finds that the suppressed evidence was material.
111. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(d) (1983).
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patory evidence or presents false evidence is also subject to discipline under the
umbrella provisions of the Model Code and Model Rules proscribing conduct
involving fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or misrepresentation and prohibiting con-
duct prejudicial to the administration of justice.'
12
To violate these ethical rules, both specific and general, the prosecutor usu-
ally must have personal knowledge of the existence of the exculpatory evidence
or the falsity of the evidence presented. 113 The ethical rules, in this sense, are
thus more restrictive than the due process rules, which can be violated even if
the prosecutor did not know that the evidence was false or that the exculpatory
evidence existed.'
14
The ethical duties imposed by all three of the modem codes, however, are
significantly broader than the due process standard in one important respect-
the absence of a materiality requirement. To fulfill ethical obligations the prose-
cutor must disclose all exculpatory evidence and must correct all false testi-
mony, whether or not the evidence presented or omitted is important enough, in
the context of all of the evidence presented at trial, to warrant a reversal of the
conviction.1 15 An ethical violation can, and often will, be present even when
due process is not violated.
11 6
112. Under Disciplinary Rule 1-102, a lawyer shall not "[e]ngage in conduct involving dishon-
esty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation [or] [e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4), (5) (1980).
Model Rule 8.4 states, in part, that it is unprofessional misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in con-
duct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, [or to] engage in conduct that is preju-
dicial to the administration of justice." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4
(1983).
113. Both MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (1981) and MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(d) (1983) require that the evidence be known to the
prosecutor. See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(3), (4), & (5)
(1980) ("knowingly"); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1983) ("knowingly").
Some rules do not specifically state that the suppression or falsification has to be done knowingly.
See, eg., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-109(A) (1980); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(a) (1983). The Preamble to the Model Rules states that
"'knowingly,' 'known' or 'knows' denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's
knowledge may be inferred from circumstances." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pre-
amble (1983).
114. See, e.g., Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375 (due process can be violated even though prosecutor does
not know of suppressed evidence); Giglio, 405 U.S. 150 (knowledge of other prosecutor imputed to
trial prosecutor); Barbee v. Warden of Md. Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964) (knowledge of
police officers imputed to prosecutor).
115. The comment to Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) acknowledges that this omission of a material-
ity requirement makes the ethical rule broader than the due process duty:
Given the restrictive qualifying language of Agurs, it appears that a disparity exists between
the prosecutor's disclosure duty as a matter of law and the prosecutor's disclosure duty as a
matter of ethics. Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) does not limit the prosecutor's ethical duty to
disclose to situations in which the defendant requests disclosure. Nor does it impose a
restrictive view of "materiality." Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) states that the prosecutor has
a duty to make a timely disclosure of any evidence that tends to negate guilt, mitigate the
degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment. It appears possible, therefore, that a pros-
ecutor may comply with the constitutional standards set forth in Brady and Agurs and still
be in violation of Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B). See State v. Harwood, 94 Idaho 615, 495
P.2d 160, 162 (1972), in which the court stated that Disciplinary Rule 7-103 and Ethical
Consideration 7-13 imposed a duty on the prosecution "to make available all evidence
which tends to aid in ascertaining the truth."
ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 96, at 330.
116. United States v. Anderson, 574 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. Marzeno v.
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C. Adoption by the States
However persuasive their logic, and however compelling as an expression of
the intent of the organized bar, the Model Code and Model Rules are only what
they purport to be-models. They may serve to guide, but they have no binding
legal effect unless adopted by individual jurisdictions. Once adopted by a juris-
diction, however, ethical rules have the force of law and serve as the basis for
disciplining lawyers within the jurisdiction.
Over the last twenty years every state117 has adopted rules for lawyer disci-
pline. 118 All of the states have based their disciplinary codes to some degree on
either the Model Code or Model Rules. 119 All of the states have adopted gen-
eral prohibitions against fraud, deceit, and conduct prejudicial to the administra-
tion ofjustice. 120 Without exception, the states prohibit the presentation of false
testimony and require a lawyer to divulge that which is required by law. 12 1 The
vast majority of the states have also followed the ABA's lead in enacting rules
specifically prohibiting prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence.122
Gengler, 574 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1978); Ruiz v. Cadry, 548 F. Supp. 764 (E.D. Wis. 1982); Nelson v.
State, 59 Wis. 2d 474, 208 N.W.2d 410 (1973).
117. In this and following sections "state" also refers to the District of Columbia.
118. See 1-4 NAT'L REP. ON LEGAL ETHics AND PROF. RESPONSIBILITY (Univ. Publ. of Am.
1986) [hereinafter NATIONAL REPORTER]. The ethical rules generally are adopted by either a state's
highest court or a state's bar. See id. at AL:I (Alabama State Bar adopted Code of Professional
Responsibility); id. at ID:l (Idaho Supreme Court approved the Code of Professional Responsibility
as adopted by the Idaho State Bar); id. at GA:l (Georgia State Bar adopted the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility). That the states have broad power to regulate the practice of law is
beyond question. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
119. According to the Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 01:3 (Feb. 18, 1987), the
following states have adopted ethical rules based on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsi-
bility: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Caro-
lina (takes structure and substance from both Model Rules and the Model Code), Oregon (amended
Model Code incorporating substance of some Model Rules), Virginia (amended Model Code incor-
porating substance of some Model Rules), Washington, and Wyoming. Those states basing their
rules primarily on using the ABA Model Code of Professional Conduct are: Alabama, Alaska,
Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. See 1-4 NATIONAL REPORTER, supra (although Idado, Indiana, Louisiana,
Missouri, and Wyoming are included in the National Reporter material, the current information
included in the Lawyer's Manual indicates that effective January 1987 these states have adopted
ethical roles based on the Model Rules). California has adopted an abbreviated set of ethical rules
based on the Model Code that are supplemented by statutes found in the California Business and
Professions Code. See CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr (1974); CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §§ 6067-6228 (West 1954).
120. See, eg., 2 NATIONAL REPORTER, supra note 118, at IN:11, MN: Rules: 93 (Indiana's
adoption of Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4) and (5), and Minnesota's adoption of Rules 8.4(c) and
(d), respectively).
121. See 1-4 NATIONAL REPORTER, supra note 118.
122. Forty-four jurisdictions have adopted verbatim the language of Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B)
or Model Rule 3.8(D). Of the others the new North Carolina Rule 7.3(D) parallels 3.8(d) with only
minor changes; Rule 3.7 (I)(2) of Maine's Code of Professional Responsibility tracks the language of
Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) but omits the requirement that the suppressed evidence be "known to the
prosecutor or other government lawyer"; Massachusetts has added to its Disciplinary Rules a set of
additional rules for prosecutors based on the ABA's Standards Relating to the Prosecution Func-
tion-PF 7(a), which requires disclosure by the prosecutor of exculpatory evidence, has language
taken both from Standard 3-3.11 of the ABA Standards for the Prosecution Function and Discipli-
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Looking at the rules contained in the disciplinary codes, it seems obvious
that the Supreme Court was correct in describing the system of disciplinary rules
available to punish prosecutors for suppressing exculpatory evidence or present-
ing false evidence as a "well-developed and pervasive mechanism." 12 3 For this
mechanism to be meaningful, however, it must operate to punish prosecutors
who violate it.
V. THE IMPOSITION OF DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS FOR BRADY-TYPE
MISCONDUCT-THE MISSING LINK
A. A Brief Discourse On Lawyer Disciplinary Systems
Most states have adopted procedures for lawyer discipline based on the
1979 ABA Standards for Lawyer Discipline and Disability Proceedings. 124
Under this model, individuals, most often clients, trigger disciplinary investiga-
tions by making complaints. 125 A full-time bar counsel126 initially investigates
the complaints and recommends a course of action to the chairperson of a hear-
nary Rule 7-103(B); New Jersey's RPC 3.8(d) is based on Model Rule 3.8(d), but it leaves out "or
information" and substitutes "supports innocence" for "tends to negate the guilt of the accused";
Virginia's Disciplinary Rule 8-102 (A)(4) imposes a duty specifically on prosecutors to disclose to a
defendant "all information required by law"; only Alabama, California, and Georgia do not have a
code provision specifically prohibiting prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence. See 1-4
NATIONAL REPORTER, supra note 118. Because it is presently unclear whether prosecutors in Ala-
bama are even subject to discipline, see supra note 103, such a provision would obviously be superflu-
ous in that state. As Price v. State Bar of Cal., 30 Cal. 3d 537, 638 P.2d 1311, 179 Cal. Rptr. 914
(1982), makes clear, the other California rules and statutes can be used to punish a prosecutor for
actions that deceive the court. See infra notes 199-214 and accompanying text. In Georgia a prose-
cutor who suppresses evidence could still be subject to discipline under the Georgia Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility for violating Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), 7-102(A)(3), and 7-
109(A), all of which mirror their Model Code counterparts. See 1 NATIONAL REPORTER, supra
note 118, at GA. Georgia has also adopted Ethical Consideration 7-13, which condemns
prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence. Id. In addition to the Disciplinary Rules and
Ethical Considerations, Georgia has adopted 67 "Standards of Conduct," each of which sets out an
ethical duty and a concomitant maximum punishment. Standard 56 states that a lawyer may be
punished by disbarment for suppressing any evidence that the lawyer or his or her client have an
obligation to produce. Id.
123. Malley v. Briggs, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1097 n.5 (1986).
124. STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS (1983) [hereinafter
STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE]. The Standards for Lawyer Discipline and Disability Pro-
ceedings were approved by the ABA House of Delegates in February 1979. In 1984 the ABA Center
for Professional Responsibility published a Survey of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures. The informa-
tion contained in the Survey was obtained from the disciplinary offices of individual jurisdictions
that had adopted disciplinary procedures modeled on the STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE.
See SURVEY OF LAWYER DISCIPLINARY PROCEUDRES IN THE UNITED STATES preface (1984).
125. See Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974
U. ILL. L.F. 193, 206-07. This Article contains a study of complaints filed with the New York City
Bar Association in 1970 which reveals that 713 of the 996 total complaints filed related to offenses
against clients. Id. at 212-13; see also C. WOLFRAM, supra note 87, at 100 (discussing the complaint
process in general).
126. STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, supra note 124, Standard 3.2 suggests that the
prosecutorial function should be performed by a lawyer-a bar counsel-hired on a full time basis.
Standard 3.9 describes the duties of this bar counsel. Id. Standard 3.9. Standard 8.4 calls for the bar
counsel to screen the complaint to make sure it concerns a lawyer who is licensed to practice in the
jurisdiction and that, if true, it alleges facts which would constitute misconduct. Id. Standard 8.4.
According to Standard 8.5 counsel should, after the requirements of Standard 8.4 are met, investi-
gate the allegations. See id. Standard 8.5.
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ing committee.1 27
Following the initial investigation, which includes notice to the attorney-
respondent and an opportunity to be heard, 12 8 bar counsel can recommend that
the complaint be dismissed as meritless,129 or that the attorney receive a minor
sanction such as probation or an admonition. 130 Up until this point the pro-
ceedings generally are confidential.' 3 ' If bar counsel finds probable cause as to
the charges of misconduct and deems the misconduct serious, a formal com-
plaint is issued, and the disciplinary process is opened to the public.
132
After the filing of a formal complaint, the attorney is entitled to an adver-
sary hearing before a hearing committee. 133 The hearing committee issues a
written report containing findings of fact and recommended disposition. 134 The
sanctions include probation, censure, suspension from practice for a specified
period, disbarment, and reprimand. 135 The recommendations of the hearing
committee are reviewed by a disciplinary board, which may approve, modify, or
disapprove the recommendations.
136
Either side may appeal the board's recommendations to the highest court of
the state.' 37 Most state supreme courts reserve the right to impose the harshest
sanctions-suspension or disbarment.
138
127. STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, supra note 124, Standards 3.6, 3.7 describe the
composition and function of the hearing committee. Standard 8.11 calls for the recommendation of
bar counsel to be reviewed by the chairperson of the hearing committee, who may approve, modify,
or disapprove counsel's recommendation or order further investigation. Id. Standard 8.11.
128. See STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, supra note 124, Standard 8.8.
129. See STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, supra note 124, Standard 8.9 (counsel must
make initial recommendation for disposition of matter); id. Standard 8.10(a) (action should be dis-
missed if there is not probable cause to believe that misconduct has occurred). In a study of Califor-
nia complaint files in 1969-70, 74.5% of the complaints were dismissed at this early stage. See
Marks & Catheart, supra note 125, at 215.
130. See STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, supra note 124, Standard 8.10(b) (admonition
to be issued if the misconduct is minor and isolated); id. Standard 8.10(c) (probation should be
imposed when appropriate); id. Standard 6.7 & commentary (probation limited to two years; proba-
tion appropriate when the respondent has problems that require supervision, but still can perform
legal services).
131. STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, supra note 124, Standard 8.24 states that discipli-
nary proceedings should normally not be public until formal charges are filed.
132. See STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, supra note 124, Standard 8.25 (discussing the
public nature of disciplinary proceedings once formal charges have been filed and served). In con-
trast to the general acceptance of the other Disciplinary Standards, in 1983 only 16 of the 54 report-
ing jurisdictions had adopted rules for public disciplinary proceedings after the filing of formal
charges. SURVEY, supra note 124, at 22.
133. See STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, supra note 124, Standards 8.26 to 8.40
(describing the procedures before the hearing committee).
134. See STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, supra note 124, Standard 8.41.
135. See STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, supra note 124, Standards 6.1 to 6.10.
136. See STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, supra note 124, Standards 8.42 to 8.44, 8.49.
137. See STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, supra note 124, Standard 8.47.
138. See STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, supra note 124, Standard 8.49 & commentary;
id. Standard 8.48 (report of the Board must be fied with the court unless the matter has been
dismissed without an appeal or a reprimand has been issued and there is no appeal); id. Standards
6.1 to 6.4 (providing that the court has the exclusive power in matters of suspension or disbarment).
Forty-five of the fifty-four jurisdictions responding to the 1983 Survey reported that the state's high-
est court had the exclusive power to disbar a lawyer. SURVEY, supra note 124, at 10. Forty-four
indicated that the exclusive power to suspend a lawyer rested with the highest court. Id.
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B. Methodology
No reporter service collects and publishes all cases involving disciplinary
sanctions. To determine the extent to which prosecutors are disciplined for
Brady-type violations, those printed sources that are available were reviewed
and this review was supplemented with survey forms sent to bar counsel in every
state.
The published materials examined include the ABA/BNA Lawyers Man-
ual on Professional Conduct; 139 The National Reporter on Legal Ethics and
Professional Responsibility;140 reports published by the ABA Center for Profes-
sional Responsibility; 14 1 books discussing professional responsibility and legal
ethics; 14 2 books and articles on prosecutorial misconduct;143 numerous articles
139. The Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) is a looseleaf service and guide to handling
ethical dilemmas that are commonly encountered by lawyers. The manual is divided into different
problem areas and contains full-text reprints of the ABA Model Rules, other important professional
standards, ABA ethics opinions, case citations, and digests of ethics opinions from state and local
bar associations. It is supplemented monthly and is accompanied by a second binder, Current Re-
ports, which reviews the latest court decisions, ethics opinions, disciplinary proceedings, and legisla-
tive action related to legal ethics.
140. See 1-4 NATIONAL REPORTER, supra note 118. This is a four-binder collection of state bar
ethics opinions, state and federal court cases, literature and court case bibliographies, and compre-
hensive ethics opinion and court case indexes.
141. See ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY BY STATE (1980); ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DISCIPLI-
NARY LAW AND PROCEDURE RESEARCH SYSTEM (6th ed. 1983); ABA CENTER FOR
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, STATISTICAL REPORT REGARDING FACTUAL INFORMATION ON
PUBLIC DISCIPLINE IMPOSED AGAINST LAWYERS BY STATE JURISDICTIONS 1980-81 (1983); ABA
CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO LAWYER MISCON-
DUCT (1984).
142. See ABA DISCIPLINARY WORKSHOP (June 9-11, 1977); R. ARONSON, J. DEVINE & W.
FISCH, PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1985); M. BLOOM,
THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS (1968); J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW
YORK CITY BAR (1966); G. COSTIGAN, JR., CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON LEGAL ETHICS
(2d ed. 1933); H. DRINKER, supra note 87; EDUCATION IN THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
OF THE LAWYER (D. Weckstein ed. 1970); M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM (1975); G. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1978); F. HICKS, ORGANIZA-
TION AND ETHICS OF THE BENCH AND BAR (1932); H. JESSUP, THE PROFESSIONAL IDEALS OF THE
LAWYER: A STUDY OF LEGAL ETHICS (1925); LAWYERS' ETHICS: CONTEMPORARY DILEMMAS
(A. Gerson ed. 1980); J. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR (1978); F. MARKS, K. LESWING & B.
FORTINSKY, THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1972); R. MA-
THEWS, PROBLEMS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF MEMBERS OF THE LEGAL PRO-
FESSION (6th Printing 1974); NATIONAL ORG. OF BAR COUNSEL, DISCIPLINARY MANUAL (1973);
L. PATrERSON, supra note 89; 0. PHILLIPS & P. MCCOY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS
(1952); J. PIKE, BEYOND THE LAW (1963); M. PIRSIG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGAL ETHICS
(1949); PRACTICAL ISSUES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (Legal
Medical Studies, Inc. 1984); P. STERN, LAWYERS ON TRIAL (1980); THE GOOD LAWYER: LAW-
YERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS (D. Luban ed. 1983); S. TISHER, L. BERNABEI & M. GREEN,
BRINGING THE BAR TO JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SIX BAR ASSOCIATIONS (1977); W.
TRUMBULL, MATERIALS ON THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1957); R. WISE,
LEGAL ETHICS (2d ed 1970); C. WOLFRAM, supra note 87.
143. See B. DAVIDSON, INDICT AND CONVICT (1971); B. GESHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MIS-
CONDUCT (1986); J. LAWLESS, JR., PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (1985); NATIONAL ASS'N OF
ATTORNEYS GEN., PROSECUTOR TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (1972); NATIONAL COL-
LEGE OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS, THE PROSECUTOR IN AMERICA (J. Douglass ed. 1977); THE
PROSECUTOR (W. McDonald ed. 1979); Aschuler, supra note 56; Gershian, The Burger Court and
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 21 CRIM. L. BULL. 217 (1985); Gershman, Why Prosecutors Misbehave, 22
CRIM. L. BULL. 131 (1986) [hereinafter Gershman, Why Prosecutors Misbehave]; Singer, Forensic
Misconduct by Federal Prosecutors-And How It Grew, 20 ALA. L. REV. 227 (1968); Comment,
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discussing the Brady doctrine; 1' published compilations of state disciplinary
decisions; 145 and American Law Reports Annotations dealing with the disciplin-
ing of lawyers and prosecutors. 146 Computer searches were also conducted.
To complement the above research, a letter and accompanying survey form
were sent to bar counsel in all of the states. 147 The letter and survey asked for
information concerning disciplinary actions for the time period from January 1,
1980, until May 15, 1986.148 The bar counsel were asked to report all discipli-
nary actions involving prosecutorial suppression of evidence and presentation of
false evidence. Cases falling into two categories were specifically requested:
Actions Against Prosecutors Who Suppress or Falsify Evidence, 47 TEX. L. REV. 642 (1969); Note,
The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct in the Prosecution of a Criminal Case, 54
COLUM. L. REv. 946 (1954); Note, Sticks and Stones in Connecticut Criminal Courts: State v. Cou-
ture, 18 CONN. L. REV. 407 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Sticks and Stones]; Note, Refusal to Discipline
Deceitful Illinois Prosecutor-In Re Friedman, 29 DE PAUL L. REv. 657 (1980) [hereinafter Note,
Refusal to Discipline].
144. See Alderstein, Ethics, Federal Prosecutors, and Federal Courts. Some Recent Problems, 6
HoFsrRA L. REV. 755 (1978); Babcock, supra note 74; Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence:
Avoiding the Agurs Problems of Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM L.
REv. 391 (1984); Caron, The Capital Defendant's Right to Obtain Exculpatory Evidence from the
Prosecution to Present in Mitigation Before Sentencing, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 207 (1985); Smoot,
Discovery in Texas Criminal Cases: How Far Have We Come?, 8 AM. J. CRIM. L. 91 (1980); Com-
ment, The Duty of the Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 858 (1960)
[hereinafter Comment, The Duty of the Prosecutor]; Comment, supra note 49; Comment, Materiality
and Defense Requests: Aids in Defining the Prosecutor's Duty of Disclosure, 59 IowA L. REv. 433
(1973); Comment, Disclosure to the Guilty Pleading Defendant: Brady v. Maryland and the Brady
Trilogy, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 165 (1981); Comment, Brady v. Maryland, supra note 2;
Comment, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Reconsidered-United States v. Agurs, 96 S. CL 2392
(1976), 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 480; Note, A Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Promises of Favorable Treat-
ment Made to Witnesses for the Prosecution, 94 HARV. L. REV. 887 (1981); Note, The Prosecutor's
Duty to Disclose to Defendants Pleading Guilty, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1004 (1986); Note, The Prosecu-
tor's Dilemma-A Duty to Disclose or A Duty Not to Commit Reversible Error, 40 LA. L. REV. 513
(1980); Note, The Prosecutorial Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Information, 34 S.C.L. REv. 67 (1982);
Note, The Brady Doctrine in Florida, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 356 (1979); Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to
Disclose After United States v. Agurs, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 690; Note, Grand Jury: A Prosecutor Need
Not Present Exculpatory Evidence, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 110 (1981); Note, Prosecutorial Duty to
Disclose Unrequested Impeachment Evidence: The Fifth Circuit's Approach, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 163
(1983).
145. See H. HAYNSWORTH, IV, HANDBOOK ON LEGAL ETHICS FOR SOUTH CAROLINA LAW-
YERS (1986); Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASS'N & THE Los ANGELES DAILY JOURNAL, ETHICS
OPINIONS (I. Sherman ed. 1967); NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS'N COMM. ON PROF. DISCIPLINE,
THE STATE OF DISCIPLINE IN NEW YORK STATE (1984); OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEES ON PRO-
FESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND THE NEW
YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION (1985); SELECTED OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE FLORIDA BAR (1968).
146. See Annotation, Communication With Party Represented by Counsel as Ground for Disci-
plining Attorney, 26 A.L.R.4th 102 (1983); Annotation, supra note 103; Annotation, Fabrication or
Suppression of Evidence as Ground of Disciplinary Action Against Attorney, 40 A.L.R.3d 169 (1971)
[hereinafter Annotation, Fabrication].
147. The letter and survey form are attached to this Article as an appendix. They were sent to
individuals included in the 1985-86 Roster of Trial Counsel of the National Organization of Bar
Counsel, as effective September 1985. In several instances the individuals who received the letter
happened not to be directly connected with disciplinary enforcement, but graciously forwarded the
letter to the proper office.
148. Although the author initially intended to ask for information for a much longer period of
time, he was dissuaded by several bar counsel who informed him that, because of inadequate record
keeping, many bar counsel would be unable to supply this information. For a discussion of the
problems of inadequate record keeping by bar disciplinary organizations, see ABA SPECIAL COMM.
ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DIS-
CIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1970) [hereinafter PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS].
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those in which formal complaints were issued, and those not resulting in a for-
mal complaint, but in which some private informal sanction was imposed.149
C. Reported Cases in Which Disciplinary Action Considered
What is most surprising about the published reports of disciplinary actions
against prosecutors for Brady-type violations is their limited number. With the
ethical rules so clear and the large number of opinions containing evidence of
intentional misconduct, one would expect bar disciplinary bodies and courts to
be busy dealing with this problem. The opposite is true--only nine cases were
uncovered in which discipline was even considered. Because these cases com-
prise the bulk, if not all, of the reported instances of discipline for Brady-type
misconduct, they are worth discussing in some detail.
1. Miller v. Pate
Miller v. Pate 150 is the only United States Supreme Court Brady case for
which there is any record of a disciplinary proceeding. Miller was convicted of
the gruesome murder of a young child. A crucial piece of evidence used against
Miller at trial was a pair of shorts with large reddish-brown stains allegedly
worn by him during the murder. After the prosecutors had successfully resisted
a defense request for independent scientific examination of the shorts, a State
Bureau of Crime Identification chemist testified for the state that the stains con-
sisted of blood of the victim's grouping type.151 The prosecution repeatedly rep-
resented that the shorts were a" 'garment heavily stained with blood.' "152 The
jury convicted Miller and sentenced him to death.' 5 3
During a hearing on his federal habeas corpus petition Miller was finally
permitted to get an independent expert to test the shorts. This expert tested
threads from each of the ten reddish-brown stains on the shorts. He found that
149. The author considered asking for information about all cases in which allegations of Brady-
type misconduct were investigated, but was advised by several bar counsel that this information
would be extremely difficult to provide because of a lack of proper indexing. Although many disci-
plinary organizations now keep records of all matters investigated, they usually have no subject
matter index. Thus, to provide this information a respondent would have had to look at each file to
see if it fell within the requested category, an exceedingly onerous task. Several respondents in
smaller jurisdictions nevertheless undertook this exhaustive search on their own before returning the
survey form.
150. 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
151. Id. at 2-4. The chemist testified:
I examined and tested "People's Exhibit 3" to determine the nature of the staining material
upon it. The result of the first test was that this material upon the shorts is blood. I made
a second examination which disclosed that the blood is of human origin. I made a further
examination which disclosed that the blood is of group "A."
Id. at 4. The Court described the stained shorts as "an important link in the chain of circumstantial
evidence" against Miller. Id.
152. Id. at 6. The prosecutors twice referred to the stained shorts in their argument to the jury.
Both Miller, who testified at trial and denied ownership of the shorts, and the Illinois Supreme
Court, which affirmed Miller's conviction and sentence, described the shorts as stained with blood.
Id. at 4.
153. Id. at 2.
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the stains were in fact paint, and could find no traces of blood. 154 The prosecu-
tors admitted that they knew there was paint on the shorts at the time of trial
and also that they had a memorandum from the police to this effect in their
possession during the trial.1 55 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, find-
ing that the prosecutors were guilty of "consistent and repeated misrepresenta-
tion" and had "deliberately misrepresented the truth."
156
Because of the notoriety of the case the Illinois State Bar Association, an its
own motion, conducted an investigation of the case, and then took the unusual
step of publishing its findings.' 5 7 The Committee refused to bring any discipli-
nary charges against the two prosecutors involved, finding that the Supreme
Court had "misapprehended the facts of the case."
158
In refusing to find misconduct the Committee relied on the chemist's testi-
mony from the original trial that there was blood on the shorts. It pointed out
that Miller had never fully refuted this testimony because his expert could not
state that there never had been blood on the shorts. 159 Because the prosecutors
were not guilty of putting on false testimony by presenting evidence that there
was blood on the ,horts, the Committee reasoned that the only possible ethical
violation concerned the prosecutors' decision not to inform the defense that
there was paint in addition to blood on the shorts. The Committee found that
the presence of paint on the shorts was not a material issue at trial and that the
prosecutors had no reason to believe that the evidence of the paint would have
been helpful to the defense.
160
Whether through negligence or by design, the Grievance Committee totally
misconstrued the nature of the misconduct that so bothered the Supreme
Court. 161 The Supreme Court never held that the prosecution had presented
perjured testimony in putting up evidence that there was blood on the shorts.
162
Nor did the Court reverse the conviction solely because the prosecutors had
suppressed exculpatory evidence. Instead, the Court reversed Miller's convic-
tion because the prosecutors consistently and repeatedly misrepresented to the
jury that the large stains on the shorts were blood when in fact they were paint,
and had relied on the "[incalculable] gruesomely emotional impact upon the
jury"'163 of these vivid stains in obtaining a conviction and death penalty, even
though they knew that the stains were mostly paint.
154. Id. at 5.
155. Id. at 6.
156. Id.
157. See Grievance Committee's Findings Re Prosecution of the Miller Murder Case, 56 ILL. BAR
J. 955 (1968).
158. Id. at 956.
159. Id. at 956-57.
160. Id. at 956.
161. Professor Alschuler described the Committee's decision as "disingenuous." Alschuler,
supra note 56, at 672.
162. Alschuler, supra note 56, at 672. The Court never resolved the question whether there was
in fact blood on the shorts, although it clearly had doubts about this. Miller, 386 U.S. at 5 n.12.
163. Miller, 386 U.S. at 5.
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2. In re Stender
In In re Stender 164 Albert Stender, an assistant prosecutor in New Jersey,
was prosecuting a narcotics case arising from the arrest of eight persons. One of
those arrested was an undercover police officer and another was an informant.
Stender prepared and filed complaints for six of the defendants, but not for the
officer and informant. Prior to trial, defense counsel for the six other defend-
ants, obviously suspicious, made discovery requests for information about the
officer and informant, and the trial court ordered Stender to turn over the
information. 
165
Instead of seeking a protective order, Stender fabricated complaints for the
officer and informant. The complaints contained false names, addresses, and
bail information. Stender gave them to defense counsel along with a fictitious
memorandum containing more false information.
166
The New Jersey Disciplinary Review Board found that Stender had vio-
lated Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(4), 1-102 (A)(5), 7-102(A)(3), and 7-
102(A)(5) by supplying "incomplete, incorrect and misleading information" to
the defense attorneys. 167 The Board recommended that, because of Stender's
inexperience, unblemished prior record, and cooperation with the investigation,
he should only be publicly reprimanded, and the New Jersey Supreme Court
followed the recommendation of the Board. 168
3. People v. Steele
In People v. Steele 169 Mark Steele was convicted in a New York court of
compulsory prostitution and sentenced to ten to twenty years imprisonment. A
key part of the prosecution's case was the testimony of two women, Culberson
and Mondelli, who testified that Steele had forced them into prostitution.
170
The defense attacked their credibility at trial, claiming that the women met
before trial and concocted their stories together. Both witnesses denied under
oath that they had met or discussed the case prior to trial.171 The prosecutor
argued to the jury that this lack of collusion between the witnesses reinforced
their credibility. In addition, the prosecutor, when asked by the trial court,
164. 78 NJ. 616 (1978). The published opinion reveals only that Stender was punished for
violating Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), 7-102(A)(3), and 7-102(A)(5) in connection
with his actions as a prosecutor. The facts of the case are taken from the Decision and Recommen-
dation of the Disciplinary Review Board, No. DRB 78-59 (Oct. 16, 1978) (unpublished) [hereinafter
Decision and Recommendation], which is mentioned in the published opinion.
165. Decision and Recommendation, supra note 164, at 2. The Decision and Recommendation
does not discuss the exact nature of the requests or court order.
166. Decision and Recommendation, supra note 164, at 2. The memorandum indicated that the
complaints had been dismissed, when in fact they never had been filed. It also falsely represented
that the informant had no prior criminal record. Id. at 2.
167. Decision and Recommendation, supra note 164, at 1-2.
168. Stender, 78 N.J. at 617.
169. 65 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1946).
170. Id. at 217-18.
171. See id. at 216.
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stated that Culberson had not made a pre-trial statement. t72
A post-trial hearing revealed not only that the witnesses had met with each
other before the trial, but had done so in the presence of the prosecutor and the
police. It also was revealed that during this meeting Culberson had made a
statement to the prosecutor concerning her proposed testimony against
Steele.173 The judge ordered a new trial, holding: "A fraud has been perpe-
trated on the Court, which requires me to act. A prosecutor cannot be permit-
ted to profit by his own concealment of the true facts, in derogation of the rights
of the defendant."1 74
The New York State Bar subsequently investigated the matter.1 75 The offi-
cial referee, in a report accepted by the Appellate Division, found the prosecutor
guilty only of knowingly using the false testimony of one of the witnesses in his
summation. Because the prosecutor delivered his summation "'extemporane-
ously from notes,'" and because "'his train of thought had been interrupted'"
by an objection just before the relevant portion of his argument, the referee con-
cluded and the court agreed that the misconduct was " 'due to overzealous-
ness.' -176 Finding no "deliberate and premeditated intent to deceive the trial
court and jury," the court ordered that the prosecutor be censured.
17 7
The opinion does not explain how the prosecutor could have used the false
testimony in his summation without also eliciting the testimony during his ex-
amination of the witness. If the prosecutor knew that the former was false, then
a fortiori he knew the latter was false. And, of course, the excuses regarding
extemporaneity and the interruption of the argument were not available to jus-
tify the deliberate elicitation of the false testimony.
178
4. United States v. Kelly
As compared to the three previous cases discussed, all of which present
clear evidence of disciplinary violations warranting severe sanctions, United
States v. Kelly 179 presents a close question whether any disciplinary action was
appropriate. Kelly was a former Massachusetts state senator charged with ex-
tortion. After his trial ended in a mistrial, he filed a motion to dismiss the in-
dictment based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct. All of the misconduct
centered around the testimony of three witnesses: Masiello, an architect who
172. Id. at 220.
173. Id. at 219.
174. Id. at 221.
175. See In re Dreiband, 273 A.D. 413, 77 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1948). The opinion states that the
investigation "resulted from charges made by a Judge of the Court of General Sessions of New York
County against the respondent, an assistant district attorney, who conducted a trial before him.
(People v. Steele, 65 N.Y.S.2d 214)." Id. at 413, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 585. It is unclear whether the judge
personally referred the matter to the bar or the bar began an investigation on its own because of the
judge's comments in his published opinion.
176. Id. at 414, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
177. Id. at 414, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 586.
178. In the view of one commentator, the punishment imposed in Dreiband was apparently
lighter than that imposed on ordinary attorneys in similar cases arising in New York. See Comment,
The Duty of the Prosecutor, supra note 144, at 870 n.79.
179. 543 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Mass. 1982).
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allegedly paid cash bribes to Kelly in return for certain favors, Masiello's secre-
tary Rawson, and Rawson's attorney Olsson. At issue was whether anyone be-
sides Masiello, whose credibility was questionable, 180 could testify that he or she
had made cash payments to Kelly.
At trial Masiello testified that except for one occasion when Rawson sent
money directly to Kelly, he personally paid Kelly the cash. In contrast to her
pre-trial statements, in which she denied ever sending money to Kelly, Rawson
testified at trial that she had on several occasions sent money directly to Kelly,
and further that she had told Olsson about this before trial. 18 1 Olsson was not
present during Rawson's testimony. The prosecutor contacted Olsson and
learned that Olsson would contradict Rawson if called to testify, and that he
already had talked to the defense attorney and was planning to testify. The
prosecutor did not reveal this to the court.1 82
Olsson eventually did testify for the defense that Rawson had not told him
about sending money to Kelly.18 3 After Olsson's testimony the prosecutor
asked for a recess to contact Rawson. The prosecutor telephoned her and she
admitted to him that in her testimony she had gone "beyond" what she had told
Olsson, but the prosecutor did not ask her directly if she had committed perjury,
instead changing the subject. 184 The prosecutor reported to the judge that there
were "[c]ontradictions.... but not such that I would ask the court to delay the
course of the trial," and did not recall Rawson as a witness.18 5
At the hearing on Kelly's motion to dismiss, the prosecutor admitted that
he believed Masiello was testifying falsely about who made the cash pay-
ments. 186 He also admitted that he purposefully did not ask Rawson whether
she had perjured herself about sending money directly to Kelly and did not re-
port the full facts of his telephone conversation with Rawson to the judge.18 7
The trial court found that the prosecutor had acted unethically by present-
ing the testimony of Masiello even though he believed it to be false; by failing to
correct false testimony because he failed to report that Olsson would contradict
180. Massiello admitted to having committed perjury in the past and to having engaged in many
acts of corruption and bribery during his work on contracts for the state. Id. at 1305.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1306-07.
183. Id. at 1307.
184. Id. at 1307-08.
185. Id. at 1308.
186. The prosecutor testified as follows:
Q. You believed he was testifying incorrectly on the point, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. If incorrectly equals falsely, you will agree he was testifying falsely on the point?
A. Yes.
Q. However, you felt that you were entitled to put this evidence into the record without
bringing it to the attention of myself or Judge Tauro because you formed the opinion that,
although Massiello was giving inaccurate testimony, which you knew was inaccurate, he
wasn't intentionally or deliberately doing so, is that right?
A. Yes.
Id. at 1306.
187. Id. at 1307-08.
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Rawson as soon as he knew of this fact;1 88 by failing to pursue in his phone call
to Rawson evidence of possible perjury because it would have been helpful to the
defense; 189 and by materially misleading the court and defense counsel in his
report on the phone conversation with Rawson.19 0 Although he refused to dis-
miss the indictment, the judge referred the matter to the Massachusetts Board of
Bar Overseers. 191
The Board of Bar Overseers refused to initiate formal disciplinary proceed-
ings, 192 finding that: (1) the prosecutor believed that Masiello's testimony repre-
sented his best memory, put up other evidence contradicting Masiello's
testimony on the relevant question, and Masiello's testimony was, on the rele-
vant point, actually helpful to the defense; (2) the prosecutor did not avoid ask-
ing Rawson over the telephone whether she had committed perjury to avoid
obtaining evidence helpful to the defense-instead, he did not know he had a
duty to seek such information; and (3) there was no ethical violation in failing to
reveal the full context of this phone conversation because the conversation was
ambiguous, and because he did not know he had a duty to make full disclo-
sure. 193 The Board did not discuss the question of the propriety of the prosecu-
tor's failure to inform the court, as soon as he learned of it, that Olsson would
contradict Rawson's testimony as to what she had told him.
The Board of Overseers clearly was correct with regard to Masiello's testi-
mony. The prosecutor did not actually know the testimony was false-he just
thought it might be, and in any event the Board was correct in concluding that
the testimony as it came out was more helpful to the defense than what the
prosecutor believed the truth to be. Because the prosecutor knew that Olsson
had already talked to the defense attorney and was planning to testify, it would
also be difficult to argue that there was an ethical violation because he did not
tell the defense attorney what the attorney already knew. More troubling is the
finding that the prosecutor was not guilty of ethical violations in relation to the
conduct and reporting of his telephone conversation with Rawson on the ground
that he did not know of his ethical obligations. Even if this fact might excuse the
failure to press Rawson for further details, it can hardly be used to justify the
presentation of a misleading account of the conversation to the judge and de-
fense attorney.
188. Id. at 1311-13. The court cited Ethical Consideration 7-26 and Disciplinary Rule 7-102 as
prohibiting the presentation and requiring the correction of false testimony. Id. at 1312.
189. Id. The court cited that portion of Ethical Consideration 7-13 which requires a prosecutor
not to avoid pursuing evidence because it might aid the accused.
190. The court found that the misleading report violated Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(3) and
Ethical Consideration 7-13. Id. at 1312.
191. Id. at 1314.
192. Id.
193. At the request of the United States Attorney the judge published the letter from the Bar
Overseers containing their findings as published, along with other relevant correspondence. See
United States v. Kelly, 550 F. Supp. 901, 903 (D. Mass. 1982). The court accepted the Overseers'
findings after noting that neither the defendant nor the defense attorney had been afforded an oppor-
tunity to appear before them. Id. at 905-06.
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5. Brophy v. Committee on Professional Standards,
Third Judicial Department
In Brophy v. Committee on Professional Standards, Third Judicial Depart-
ment 194 Patrick Brophy was convicted in the United States District Court for
the Western District of New York of willfully depriving an individual of his
constitutional rights 19 5 for willfully "suborn[ing] perjury; fabricat[ing] evidence
and materials and introduc[ing] at state proceedings knowingly false, misleading
and perjured testimony and suppress[ing] favorable and exculpatory evidence,
materials and testimony .... ,,196 Brophy's sentence consisted of a $500 fine.
Brophy was automatically suspended from the practice of law because of
his conviction. 19 7 Acting on a motion to set aside the suspension, the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, lifted the suspension and ordered that
Brophy be censured. The court based its decision on Brophy's otherwise un-
blemished record and because he "ha[d] suffered the stigma of a criminal convic-
tion," 198 even though the criminal conviction was the initial basis for the
automatic suspension.
6. Price v. State Bar of California
In the case of Price v. State Bar of California,199 Price was a deputy district
attorney who had prosecuted a murder case. During the cross-examination of a
cab driver who was testifying for the state, the driver revealed that he had a
"trip ticket" detailing his movements on the day in question. The defense attor-
ney made a request for the ticket, and Price, who had not seen it before, got a
copy from the driver during a recess.
2 ° °
When he looked at the ticket, Price noticed that the entries were inconsis-
tent with the driver's testimony. He altered a copy to conform it to the testi-
mony and gave it to the defense attorney, telling him that it was a genuine copy.
Unconvinced, the defense attorney requested the original ticket. Price then went
to talk to the trial judge, ex parte, and told him of his alteration of the evidence.
The trial judge took no action. Unable to obtain the original, Price got another
194. 83 A.D.2d 975, 442 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1981). The brief opinion does not discuss the facts
underlying the conviction, but notes only that Brophy claimed his conviction resulted from an inad-
vertent Brady violation. The author attempted to obtain the briefs and other papers filed in Brophy's
appeal of his suspension, but these were unavailable because of the confidentiality of attorney disci-
plinary proceedings. Letter from New York State Law Librarian (Sept. 29, 1986). The author was
able to obtain a copy of the Indictment and Judgment in the criminal case from the office of the
Clerk of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. United States v.
Brophy, No. CR-79-65 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
195. Brophy was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982). Brophy, 83 A.D.2d at 975, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 819.
196. United States v. Brophy, No. CR-79-65, at 1 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). Brophy was charged in
three counts of a five count indictment, but was acquitted of two of the charges.
197. Id. The automatic suspension and the provision for setting aside the suspension are con-
tained in N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90 (McKinney 1983).
198. See supra note 194.
199. 30 Cal. 3d 537, 638 P.2d 1311, 179 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1982).
200. Id. at 543, 638 P.2d at 1314, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 917. The police had kept the original of the
ticket for almost two years. Id.
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copy and gave it, unchanged, to the defense attorney. Noticing the discrepan-
cies, the defense attorney again asked for the original, and Price promised to
supply it. Price finally gave the original to the defense attorney, but failed to
reveal that he personally had altered the copy.
20 1
After the defendant was convicted, Price, in order to conceal his miscon-
duct by preventing appellate review, 20 2 went to see the defendant without the
defense attorney's knowledge. Price offered to try to secure a lighter sentence if
the defendant would drop his appeal. The defendant agreed.
2 °3
After his attempts to secure a lighter sentence were unsuccessful, Price
asked a superior in the district attorney's office to help him fulfill his part of the
agreement with the defendant. Instead of assisting Price, his superiors sus-
pended him from his job and referred the matter to the Attorney General's of-
fice. Price was charged in State Bar proceedings with a number of violations of
the California Rules of Professional Conduct and the California Business and
Professions Code.2°4 The State Bar recommended disbarment.
The California Supreme Court chose a more lenient penalty. The court
found that Price violated the Business and Professions Code by entering into an
agreement with the defendant,205 by committing an act of moral turpitude,
20 6
by violating his attorney's oath and duties,20 7 and by misleading the judge, jury,
201. Id. at 544, 638 P.2d at 1314-15, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 917.
202. Price apparently assumed, correctly as it turned out, that neither the defense attorney nor
the trial judge would report the matter to the State Bar. Price admitted that his purpose in seeking
the agreement with the defendant was to hide his misconduct. Id.
203. Perhaps motivated by a reasonable distrust of Price, the defendant ignored the agreement
and filed an appeal. Id.
204. The rules governing attorney conduct in California are divided between the Business and
Professions Code statutes and the Code of Professional Responsibility. See supra note 119. Price
was charged with and acquitted of a felony for preparing a false record for a deceitful purpose.
Pnce, 30 Cal. 3d at 544-45, 638 P.2d at 1315, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 918. For some reason Price was
never charged with a misdemeanor offese under applicable sections of the Business and Professions
Code. See infra notes 205-07.
205. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6131(b) (West 1974). The statute provides, in pertinent
part:
Every attorney is guilty of a misdemeanor and, in addition to the punishment prescribed
therefor, shall be disbarred... [w]ho, having himself prosecuted... any action or proceed-
ing in any court as district attorney or other public prosecutor, afterwards, directly or
indirectly, advises in relation to or takes any part in the defense thereof, as attorney or
otherwise, or who takes or receives any valuable consideration from or on behalf of any
defendant in any such action upon any understanding or agreement whatever having rela-
tion to the defense thereof.
Id.
206. See id. § 6106. The statute provides:
The commission of any act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption,
whether the act is committed in the course of his relations as an attorney or otherwise,
whether the act is felony or misdemeanor or not, constitutes a cause for disbarment or
suspension.
If the act constitutes a felony or misdemeanor, conviction thereof in a criminal pro-
ceeding is not a condition precedent to disbarment or suspension from practice therefor.
207. Id. § 6103. The statute provides:
A willful disobedience or violation of an order of the court requiring him to do or forbear
an act connected with or in the course of his profession, which he ought in good faith to do
or forbear, and any violation of the oath taken by him, or of his duties as such attorney,
constitute causes for disbarment or suspension.
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and defense.20 8 The court found also that Price violated the California Rules of
Professional Conduct by suppressing evidence that an attorney has an obligation
to produce,20 9 and by misleading the judge, jury, and defense.210 Even though
the statute prohibiting an agreement between a prosecutor and a defendant
seemingly required disbarment, 211 and even though the statute proscribing acts
of moral turpitude specifically permitted disbarment, 212 the California Supreme
Court ordered only that Price be suspended for five years, with just two years to
be actively served.2 13 Three justices dissented and called for disbarment, noting
that Price's "conduct during [the] trial was calculated, deceitful, knowingly per-
formed for his own advantage, and was followed by a prolonged and compli-
cated attempt to cover his tracks.... [A] lawyer's presentations to the court and
counsel of deliberately fabricated documentary evidence strikes directly at the
very integrity of the judicial process."
'2 14
It strains the imagination to conceive of more egregious conduct than that
in Price's case. Despite a finding that Price was guilty of lying, deceit,
fabrication of evidence, collusion with the defendant, and an extended cover-up,
Price received only a two-year suspension.
7. Virginia State Bar v. Read
In Virginia State Bar v. Read,2 15 the court ordered Read, the prosecutor in
an arson and murder case, to reveal all exculpatory evidence to the defense,
including evidence of any witness who failed to identify the defendant as the
culprit. The trial court's order also specified that the duty to disclose such evi-
dence was to be a continuing duty.
2 16
A key witness in the prosecution's case against defendant was Sils, who saw
a man on a bicycle hovering near the fire. Sils picked the defendant's picture out
of a photo array, and later identified him at a line-up as the man on the bicycle.
208. Id. § 6128. The statute provides:
Every attorney is guilty of a misdemeanor who either:
(a) Is guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or collusion, with
intent to deceive the court or any party.
(b) Willfully delays his client's suit with a view to his own gain.
(c) Willfully receives any money or allowance for or on account of any money which
he has not laid out or become answerable for.
209. See CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7-107(A) (1981).
210. See id. Rule 7-105(1).
211. See supra note 205.
212. See supra note 206.
213. Price, 30 Cal. 3d at 550, 638 P.2d at 1318, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 921. The court noted that Price
had no prior disciplinary record and had been suffering considerable work-related stress. He also
had been unable to work as a lawyer during the pendency of the criminal charges and had been
denied reinstatement to the district attorney's office. Id. at 549-50, 638 P.2d at 1318, 179 Cal. Rptr.
at 921.
214. Id. at 551, 638 P.2d at 1318, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 921 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
215. For a synopsis of this case, see Virginia State Bar v. Read, [Current Reports] Law. Man. on
Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) Vol. 2, No. 20, at 400 (Oct. 29, 1986). The facts of the case are taken
from the unpublished Order of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board in Virginia District ex rel
Sixth Dist. Comm. v. Read, No. 86-17 (Sept. 11, 1986) [hereinafter Order].
216. Order, supra note 215, at 2.
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The state had other evidence linking the man on the bicycle to the crime. After
the line-up Sils began to have doubts about his identification of the defendant.
He called the prosecutor's office about this and later related his doubts in person
to an assistant prosecutor. When Sils saw the defendant at the trial he became
convinced that he had identified the wrong man. After Sils told him this Read
asked Sils if he could testify that the defendant "looked like" the man on the
bicycle. Sils said that he could, but he would also have to say that he was certain
the defendant was not the man.
217
Read did not inform the defense about Sils' change of position. Instead, he
had an employee tell Sils that he would not be called as a witness and his pres-
ence was no longer required. Sils went home, but later called defense counsel
and related what had happened.
218
The Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board concluded that Read had inten-
tionally decided not to reveal Sils' change of position, thus violating Virginia's
Disciplinary Rule 8-102(A)(4), which requires a prosecutor to "disclose to a
defendant all information required by law."' 2 19 The Board ordered the revoca-
tion of Read's license to practice law. The final outcome is still in doubt, how-




Only two other published reports of prosecutors being subject to possible
disciplinary actions for Brady-type misconduct could be found. In Turner v.
Ward2 21 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed a
rape conviction because the prosecutor had advised the victim's physician to
conceal the fact the physician's physical examination of the victim did not reveal
any evidence of sexual intercourse. 222 A subsequent law review comment indi-
cated, without elaboration, that no disciplinary action was taken against the
prosecutor.223 Finally, a compilation of disciplinary rulings in South Carolina
reveals one case in which a prosecutor was "cautioned" because he "lied in his
argument to the jury in a murder case" and because his refusal to disclose excul-
217. Order, supra note 215, at 2-4.
218. Order, supra note 215, at 4-5. The criminal charges were dismissed the next day because of
unrelated prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 4 n.l.
219. Order, supra note 215, at 5; see VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 8-
102 (A)(4) (1950). The Board also found that he violated Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(3), which
provides: "A lawyer shall riot... [c]ommit a crime or other deliberately wrongful act that reflects
adversely on a lawyer's fitness to practice law." Id. DR 1-102(A)(3).
220. Telephone interview with Virginia Bar Counsel (Nov. 13, 1986).
221. 321 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1963).
222. The doctor's examination revealed evidence only of rectal intercourse. Because the rape
charge required proof of vaginal intercourse, the examination results were exculpatory. The doctor
testified at the habeas corpus hearing that, minutes before trial, he was advised by the prosecutor to
discuss his findings only in general terms of sexual assault and to say nothing about the sodomy
unless specifically asked. The prosecutor denied these allegations, but the District Court credited the
testimony of the doctor. Id. at 919-20.
223. See Comment, supra note 143, at 643.
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patory evidence was "improper. ' '224
That is all that could be found-nine cases.225 Three of them resulted in no
disciplinary action. Four prosecutors received relatively minor sanctions-one
reprimand, one caution, and two censures. One case is currently on appeal.
Only in Price, in which the prosecutor engaged in an extended course of unethi-
cal behavior, was a major sanction imposed, and that only a suspension.
226
D. Survey Results
The results of the survey confirm the pattern revealed in the previous sec-
tion concerning both the infrequency of disciplinary actions against prosecutors
for Brady-type misconduct and the leniency of the sanctions actually imposed.
Replies to the letter and survey form were received from forty-one states.
227
224. H. HAYNSWORTH, IV, supra note 145, at 4-27. No further details of this case are provided.
225. Several cases were also found in which prosecutors faced disciplinary sanctions for miscon-
duct not falling precisely within the scope of Brady-type misconduct. See In re Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d
392, 392 N.E.2d 1333 (1979). In Friedman a prosecutor had instructed witnesses in several cases to
testify falsely under oath in order to trap defense attorneys who were suspected of bribing witnesses.
As part of this scheme the prosecutor had also secreted the complaining witnesses in one case to
make it appear that the witnesses were unwilling to proceed with the prosecution. The Illinois
Supreme Court found that the prosecutor had violated his ethical responsibilities by presenting per-
jured testimony and hiding witnesses, but discharged the prosecutor without imposing any discipline
because of the lack of precedent and Friedman's belief in the propriety of his conduct. Id. at 398-99,
392 N.E.2d at 1336. The refusal to punish Friedman has been criticized. See Note, Refusal to
Discipline, supra note 143, at 667-71; see also In re Brian F. Malone, 105 A.D.2d 455, 457-59, 480
N.Y.S.2d 603, 606 (1984) (Inspector General of Department of Corrections censured for ordering a
guard to testify falsely in front of him in order to protect guard from retaliation by other guards),
aff'd, 65 N.Y.2d 772, 482 N.E.2d 565, 492 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1985).
One Wisconsin prosecutor received a public reprimand for communicating directly with a de-
fendant and for failing to disclose a defendant's non-exculpatory statement as required by the Wis-
consin discovery statutes. See In re Robert D. Zapf, 126 Wis. 2d 123, 125-27, 375 N.W.2d 654, 655-
56 (1985). A second Wisconsin prosecutor was publicly reprimanded for opposing a defendant's
parole request in contravention of a specific provision of a plea agreement. See Steil, Public Repri-
mand ofRodney A. Zemke, 58 Wis, BAR BULL. 70, 70 (1985). In In re Burrows, 291 Or. 135, 144-
46, 629 P.2d 820, 823-24 (1981), a prosecutor received a public reprimand for using a defendant as a
witness before a grand jury without the defense attorney's knowledge.
The somewhat bizarre case of Burkett v. Chandler, 505 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
423 US. 876 (1975), involved a confrontation between a District Court Judge and the U.S. Attor-
ney's office over the location of a key witness in a dispute between the IRS and the Governor of
Oklahoma. The judge ordered the U.S. Attorney and several of his assistants disbarred and cited
them for contempt for refusing to produce the governor's former secretary, who was being secreted
by the IRS. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the U.S.
Attorney had not directly disobeyed an order of the court; obviously, the court viewed the whole
matter as a tempest in a teapot. Burkett, 505 F.2d at 224-25.
In all of these cases, as in the Brady-type cases, the individual most directly affected by the
misconduct was the present or potential criminal defendant. In contrast to the uniformly lenient
sanctions imposed in these situations, prosecutors who violate their ethical duties in order to help a
criminal defendant often are severely disciplined. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm. v. Green,
278 Md. 412, 365 A.2d 39 (1976) (prosecutor disbarred after convictions of subornation of perjury
and obstruction of justice arising out of scheme to illegally expunge a criminal record); Robinson v.
Grievance Comm., 70 A.D.2d 209, 211-12, 420 N.Y.S.2d 430, 432 (1979) (prosecutor disbarred for
giving confidential information about pending cases to organized crime figures), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 830 (1980). But see Alschuler, supra note 56, at 673 (even in these situations "courts have
sometimes exhibited a strange hesitancy to subject prosecutors to the rules that are applicable to
other lawyers").
226. Although this cannot be proven definitively the leniency of the sanctions in this area proba-
bly reflects special treatment for prosecutors. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
227. Most respondents returned the survey form, although several answered in a letter. Because
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Thirty-five states reported that no formal complaints had been filed for Brady-
type misconduct. The response from one state indicated that three formal com-
plaints had been fied and dismissed after a hearing. Of the five other responses
reflecting the issuance of a formal complaint, two involved cases already dis-
cussed in this Article,228 and three referred to the imposition of sanctions for
non-Brady-type misconduct.
229
Only two states reported the imposition of informal sanctions in cases in
which no formal complaints were filed. One reported the issuance of a letter of
caution, 230 and another indicated one minor disciplinary action that could not
be specified for reasons of confidentiality.
231
Taken together, the survey results and the reported cases demonstrate that,
at least up to the present, the United States Supreme Court's reliance on the
Disciplinary Rules as a deterrent for Brady-type misconduct is misplaced. In
light of the numerous reported cases that contain evidence of intentional Brady -
type misconduct, the instances of discipline are too rare, and the sanctions most
often imposed too lenient, to support a reliance on the disciplinary codes, as they
have up until now been enforced, to deter Brady-type misconduct.
VI. THE NEED FOR DETERRENCE
Our system of justice generally assumes that sanctions deter future miscon-
duct, and the need to find an effective deterrent for Brady-type prosecutorial
misconduct is especially important. Prosecutorial suppression and falsification
of evidence strikes at the very heart of our criminal justice system. By definition,
Brady-type misconduct keeps relevant evidence away from the judge or jury.
Thus, not only is it misconduct by the representative of the state, but it also calls
into question the accuracy of the mechanism by which our society deprives indi-
viduals of their freedom and their lives.
Effectively insulated from disciplinary punishment and immune from civil
several states still have disciplinary systems that are divided geographically, some multiple responses
were received. Responses were received from Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida (four responses), Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York (three responses), North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio (four
responses), Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania (four responses), Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont (two responses), Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Most of the respondents supplied information for the time period requested on the survey
form-beginning January 1, 1980. Four responses did not indicate the relevant time period. Two
provided information for a shorter period-one beginning with March 1983 and the other August 1,
1983. Five respondents provided information covering a longer period than that requested. One
provided information for 14 years, another for 10 years, and 2 for 11 years. One respondent replied
that his jurisdiction had never had a case meeting the criteria requested.
228. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text (discussing Stender); supra notes 215-20
(discussing Read).
229. See In re Brian F. Malone, 65 N.Y.2d 772, 482 N.E.2d 565, 492 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1985); In re
Robert D. Zapf, 126 Wis. 2d 123, 375 N.W.2d 654 (1985).
230. From the description provided in the survey form, it appears that this is the South Carolina
case discussed supra note 224 and accompanying text.
231. The records concerning informal sanctions were not available in one jurisdiction, and a
second did not respond because the information was considered confidential.
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suit, a prosecutor contemplating Brady-type misconduct knows that the only
possible legal consequence of presenting false evidence or suppressing exculpa-
tory evidence is that the defendant may be fortunate enough to discover the
evidence and file for post-conviction relief. Even if this does occur, the defend-
ant's only hope, as this prosecutor knows, is for a court retrospectively to decide
that the evidence is material enough to warrant a new trial. The prosecutor can
take added comfort in the development of strict materiality standards and from
the general trend towards restricting post-conviction relief in criminal cases.
232
Weighed against all of this is the instant, concrete advantage of gaining a
conviction. This conviction undoubtedly is important to the prosecutor. A
prosecutor, like any other lawyer, wants to win.233 Prosecutors do not gain
renown or reelection for losing cases. It is also likely that in most cases the
prosecutor believes the defendant is guilty, and therefore might be motivated by
the concern that, in one sense, justice will not be served by revealing evidence
which will increase the probability that the defendant will go free. For any of
these reasons, the advantage to be gained at times apparently is too much for
prosecutors to resist.
2 34
232. See, eg., Murray v. Carrier, 106 S. Ct. 2639 (1986) (counsel's failure to preserve issue in
state court bars habeas corpus relief unless petitioner proves ineffective assistance of counsel); Smith
v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 2661 (1986) (failure to raise issue on direct appeal bars habeas corpus relief
even in a capital case); Hill v. Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. 366 (1985) (failure to specifically plead prejudice
in habeas corpus petition bars appellate review). For articles discussing this trend, see Hill, The
Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Cases, 78 COLUM L. Rv. 1050 (1978); Rosenberg,
Constricting Federal Habeas Corpus: From Great Writ to Exceptional Remedy, 12 HAsINGS CONST.
L.Q. 597 (1986); Soloff, Litigation and Relitigation: The Uncertain Status of Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 297 (1978); Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective
Representation of Counsel: The Supreme Court Has Work to Do, 31 STAN. L. Rnv. 1 (1978); Note,
Procedural Defaults at the Appellate Stage and Federal Habeas Corpus Review, 38 STAN. L. REv. 463
(1986).
233. As one former prosecutor has candidly admitted, an individual prosecutor's win-loss record
affects his or her status within the office and, for an assistant prosecutor, also affects his or her ability
to stay in the good graces of the head prosecutor. Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Com-
ment, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 174, 180-181 (1965).
234. The reluctance of prosecutors to follow the Brady rules is illustrated by an anecdote related
to the Second Circuit Judicial Conference by Jon 0. Newman, then United States Attorney for
Connecticut:
I recently had occasion to discuss this problem at a PLI Conference in New York City
before a large group of State prosecutors--some of them were very inexperienced-but
some of them had considerable experience. I put to them this case: You are prosecuting a
bank robbery. You have talked to two or three of the tellers and one or two of the custom-
ers at the time of the robbery. They have all taken a look at your defendant in a line-up,
and they have said, "This is the man." In the course of your investigation you also have
found another customer who was in the back and said, "This is not the man."
The question I put to these prosecutors was, do you believe you should disclose to the
defense the name of the witness who, when he viewed the suspect, said "that is not the
man"? In a room of prosecutors not quite as large as this group but almost as large, only
two hands went up. There were only two prosecutors in that group who felt they should
disclose or would disclose that information. Yet I was putting to them what I thought was
the easiest case-the clearest case for disclosure of exculpatory information!
Discovery in Criminal Cases, 44 F.R.D. 481, 500 (1967). Professor Singer cites a number of reasons
for the frequency of forensic misconduct by prosecutors: the political nature of the office, external
pressures to win "hot" cases, community pressure, inexperience and lack of training, the adversarial
nature of the legal system, and the belief that anyone charged is guilty. Singer, supra note 143, at
228-29. Professor Gershman says that prosecutorial forensic misconduct occurs simply "because it
works." Gershman, Why Prosecutors Misbehave, supra note 143, at 133; see also Caldwell, Name
[Vol. 65
1987] DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS FOR BRADY VIOLATIONS 733
Obviously a need exists to find effective ways to counteract these pressures
and to deter more effectively prosecutors from committing Brady-type miscon-
duct. Possible solutions include making changes in both our ethical and legal
procedures.
A. Changes in Disciplinary Proceedings
As section V of this Article demonstrates,2 35 two separate problems arise in
the disciplining of prosecutors for suppression or falsification of evidence. The
first involves actually getting the prosecutor before the disciplinary body for a
review of his or her actions. The second is the reluctance of disciplinary bodies
and courts to impose strong sanctions on prosecutors when a case is brought.
To some degree the inadequate reporting and weak discipline in this area
reflect wider problems within our system of lawyer discipline. Both of these
areas were considered significant problems in the 1970 Clark report,2 36 which
strongly criticized the legal profession's system of disciplinary enforcement.
2 37
As indicated in the preface to the recently adopted ABA Standards For Impos-
ing Lawyer Sanctions, both problems still persist today.2 38 These problems,
however, are most likely aggravated when it comes to disciplining prosecutors
for Brady-type misconduct. First, although it is difficult to make definitive com-
parisons, it does seem that prosecutors have been treated more leniently than
other lawyers facing discipline for similar misconduct. Leaving aside Read, in
which no final punishment has yet been imposed, the other cases demonstrate a
consistent pattern of leniency. The censure in Brophy, in which the criminal
conviction was treated as a mitigating rather than an aggravating factor, the
reprimands in Steele and Stender, and even the suspension in Price stand in
marked contrast to cases in which other attorneys have been subjected to sus-
pension or disbarment for presenting false evidence or concealing evidence.
239
Similarly, there are unique problems in bringing Brady-type misconduct to
the attention of the disciplinary bodies. As indicated earlier, most disciplinary
investigations are triggered by complaints from individuals, and most com-
plaints come from aggrieved clients.2 4 Prosecutors do not have individual cli-
Calling at Trial: Placing Parameters on the Prosecutor, 8 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 397, 409-10 (1985)
(noting the short job tenure, overwork, and lack of training for most prosecutors).
235. See supra notes 125-231 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 148.
237. PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 148, at 1-2, 167-71.
238. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N NAT'L CENTER FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, STANDARDS
FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS preface, at 1-2 (approved Feb. 1986 by the ABA House of
Delegates).
239. See, eg., In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va.) (attorney suspended for 18 months for
concealing evidence), aff'd, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967); In re Murray, 226 Ind. 221, 362 N.E.2d
128 (1977) (attorney disbarred for advising client and other witnesses to testify falsely), appeal dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 1029 (1978); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Grigsby, 493 Pa. 194, 425 A.2d 730
(1981) (lawyer disbarred for filing a false sworn pleading in a garnishment action); Smith v. State,
523 S.W.2d I (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) (attorney suspended for two and one-half years for advising client
to testify falsely during a deposition); In re Kerr, 86 Wash. 2d 655, 548 P.2d 297 (1976) (attorney
disbarred for attempting to present sworn perjury); see Annotation, Fabrication, supra note 146.
240. See supra note 125.
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ents. The most likely persons to file a complaint against a prosecutor for Brady-
type misconduct would be the defendant or the defense attorney, but there are
strong constraints which make it unlikely that a defense attorney or defendant
will lodge a complaint against a prosecutor for Brady-type misconduct.
Paramount among these constraints is that, on uncovering Brady evidence,
the defendant and the defense attorney are primarily interested in obtaining a
new trial for the defendant. A complaint to the bar, however, can undermine
the defendant's chances for a new trial. Consider, for instance, the result in
Smith v. Kemp.
24 1
In 1975 John Smith was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in a
Georgia trial court. The only witness who placed him at the scene of the crime
was an alleged accomplice, John Maree. Maree testified both at Smith's trial
and at the separate trial of a codefendant that no promises had been made to
him in return for his testimony. The prosecutor argued this fact to the jury in
Smith's trial as a reason to believe Maree.
242
In 1978 the prosecutor testified in a deposition that he had, in fact, prom-
ised Maree a recommendation for a life sentence in return for his testimony. In
1983 the prosecutor signed a sworn affidavit to the same effect.243
Smith filed a post-conviction motion asking for a new trial based on the
prosecutor's use of perjured testimony. A complaint against the prosecutor was
also lodged with the Georgia State Bar, which started an investigation into the
matter.244 The State Bar sent the prosecutor a notice of probable cause for disci-
plinary action, which included a warning that his license to practice law could
241. 715 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983).
242. Id. at 1472-73 (Hatchett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The facts surround-
ing Maree's testimony and the use made of it are discussed most extensively in Judge Hatchett's
dissenting opinion. See id. at 1472-76 (Hatchett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
243. In the deposition, which was given in connection with codefendant Machetti's case, the
prosecutor stated:
A. Well, I talked to Mr. Morae [sic] of course, prior to [petitioner Smith's] trial, and he
testified in that case and then he testified in Rebecca Machetti's trial ....
Q. Did he believe that he was going to get off free or get out with a light sentence by
testifying?
A. We had a discussion about this, and I had agreed that if he did testify that I, I would
not insist on a trial and would allow him to enter a plea of guilty and receive life sentences.
Id. at 1474 (Hatchett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The pertinent portion of the
affidavit reads:
"Prior to the trial of John Smith, I offered John Maree, the only known eyewitness to
the crime, sentences [sic] of life imprisonment in exchange for testimony against John
Smith and Rebecca Smith/Machetti. Mr. Maree agreed to testify against both John Smith
and Rebecca Machetti in exchange for sentences [sic] of life imprisonment. I further told
John Maree that I would seek the death penalty against him if he did not testify in the
trials of John Smith and Rebecca Smith/Machetti. After the trials, John Maree was in fact
permitted to plead guilty and did receive sentences of life imprisonment for his role in the
Arkins murders."
Id. at 1473-74 (quoting the affidavit) (Hatchett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
244. Id. The records relating to the investigation were entered into evidence during Smith's state
habeas corpus hearing. See Smith v. Warden, Butts Sup. Ct., No. 5588 (Ga. Mar. 24, 1983). A copy
of the transcript and exhibits was obtained from Smith's attorney at that proceeding.
[Vol. 65
1987] DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS FOR BRADY VIOLATIONS 735
be lost as a result of the disciplinary proceedings. 245 At the request of the prose-
cutor's attorney, the presentation of a formal complaint was postponed until
after the prosecutor's testimony at Smith's post-conviction hearing.
24 6
At this hearing, with representatives of the State Bar present, the prosecu-
tor repudiated his two prior sworn statements. He testified that he had made no
deal with Maree, and that his prior sworn statements were made because "his
'mind had become somewhat confused about what had actually happened.' "247
The judge conducting the post-conviction hearing found that no deal was made
and denied relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed this finding.24 8 No formal complaint was ever filed against the prosecu-
tor 2 4 9 and Smith was subsequently executed.
In addition to the possible harmful consequences to the defendant, a de-
fense attorney is also constrained by the potential effect that a complaint to the
bar will have on his or her practice. The relationship between a defense attorney
and a prosecutor usually is a continuing one, and prosecutors wield tremendous
power in this relationship. Prosecutors, by their willingness to allow discovery,
by their power in the plea bargaining process, and in innumerable other ways,
can seriously affect the life of a defense attorney. Sensible defense attorneys will
thus understandably hesitate to jeopardize a practice by filing complaints that
will have little chance of resulting in the meaningful discipline, might harm their
clients, and might well adversely affect their practices.
There is, of course, another person who could refer the matter to the disci-
plinary body-the judge. However, judges already have an ethical duty to "take
or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against a judge or lawyer for unpro-
fessional conduct of which the judge may become aware," 250 yet judges rarely
make such referrals.
25 1
The most promising solution to this dilemma is to bypass the practice of
initiating disciplinary proceedings via complaints from individuals. Instead, the
bar counsel's offices should review the reported decisions and institute discipli-
245. "Notice of Finding of Probable Cause," introduced into evidence in Smith v. Warden, Butts
Super. Ct., No. 5588 (Ga. Mar. 24, 1983).
246. Letter from Bridget B. Bagley, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Ga. State Bar, to Clayton Sinclair,
Jr., State Disciplinary Bd. (Ga. Mar. 31, 1983), introduced into evidence in Smith v. Warden, Butts
Super. Ct., No. 5588 (Ga. Mar. 31, 1983).
247. Smith, 715 F.2d at 1475 (Hatchett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
trial court testimony).
248. The majority of the Eleventh Circuit panel held that the state court's findings were entitled
to a presumption of correctness under Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981). Smith, 715 F.2d at
1465. Responding to Smith's complaint that he did not get a full and fair hearing in state court
because of the presence of the State Bar representatives at the State hearing, the majority found that
their presence actually helped Smith because he could have used it to impeach the prosecutor's
credibility. Id.
249. Telephone conversation with the Office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia (Oct.
24, 1986) (confirming that no formal complaint was filed against prosecutor).
250. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3, § B(3) (1972).
251. See generally ABA STANDING COMM. ON PROF'L DISCIPLINE; ABA CENTER FOR PROP'L
RESPONSIBILITY, THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO LAWYER MISCONDUCT 1.3 (1984) (deploring inac-
tion by trial judges in referring cases of prosecutorial misconduct to the disciplinary bodies). This
chapter concludes with a suggestion that, as a matter of policy, the prosecutor should be referred to
the bar whenever a conviction is reversed because of prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 1.14.
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nary proceedings whenever an opinion indicates possible prosecutorial suppres-
sion or falsification of evidence, irrespective of due process violations. Without
this type of change it is doubtful that disciplinary committees will ever get to
review most instances of Brady-type misconduct.
252
The second disciplinary solution is obvious. Both the courts and the bar
disciplinary bodies must start punishing Brady-type misconduct more harshly.
Reviewing more cases will be an empty gesture unless and until prosecutors face
serious discipline for suppressing or falsifying evidence.
Brady-type misconduct is serious misconduct. The ABA Standards For
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions suggest that:
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with the intent to
deceive the court, makes a false statement, submits a false document,
or improperly withholds material information, and causes serious or
potentially serious injury to a party, or causes a significant or poten-
tially significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding.
253
This describes many instances of intentional Brady-type misconduct. Of course,
not every prosecutor who intentionally presents false testimony or withholds
exculpatory evidence deserves to be disbarred or even suspended. Each case has
its own aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The decisions by the discipli-
nary boards in Price and Read to recommend disbarment for intentional Brady-
type misconduct are a positive sign that the bar disciplinary bodies, if not the
courts, are beginning to recognize the need to impose severe sanctions for this
type of misconduct. Only time will tell whether these cases represent the begin-
ning of a trend or are just isolated aberrations. In any event, it is clear that
reviewing more cases will be futile unless and until prosecutors are forced to face
serious discipline for suppressing or falsifying evidence. Prosecutors, above all
other lawyers, know the difference between a slap on the wrist and real
punishment.
252. In proposing this solution, the Author is not unmindful of the potential burden that will be
added to the already overworked and understaffed bar counsel's office. A November 1983 Statistical
Report published by the ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline and the ABA Center
for Professional Responsibility is included in the ABA's DISCIPLINARY LAW AND PROCEDURE RE-
SEARCH SYSTEM (1984), and reflects a general pattern of understaffing of bar counsel's office. Ac-
cording to this Report, in 1982 the Indiana State Bar employed 7 lawyers and I investigator to
respond to the 1512 inquiries received. Georgia had 5 lawyers and 1 investigator to handle the 1246
inquiries received.
Obviously, these figures demonstrate that bar counsel do not have a lot of time to peruse appel-
late opinions. The initial screening of decisions, however, could easily be done by law students or
paralegals, thus lessening the burden on counsel.
253. STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, supra note 124, Standard 6.11. The commentary
to this Standard notes that "lawyers who engage in these practices violate the most fundamental
duty of an officer of the court." Id. Standard 6.11 commentary. Standard 6.12 states:
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that false statements or docu-
ments are being submitted to the court or that material information is improperly being
withheld, and takes no remedial action, and causes injury or potential injury to a party to
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B. The Need for a Bad Faith Standard for Reversal
Given the overall problems in enforcing lawyer discipline and the history of
leniency afforded to prosecutors who commit Brady-type misconduct, it would
be naive to believe that changes in disciplinary enforcement alone would be suffi-
cient to deter Brady-type misconduct. The courts also have an obligation to
ensure the integrity and accuracy of judicial proceedings, whether by the exer-
cise of their supervisory power or as a matter of constitutional law. With regard
to Brady-type misconduct, this can be achieved by adopting a standard that
requires reversal of a conviction on a finding that a prosecutor intentionally sup-
pressed exculpatory evidence or presented false evidence; that is, on a finding
that the prosecutor acted in bad faith.
2 54
To deter police misconduct, the United States Supreme Court has been will-
ing to use the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to keep physical evidence
from being admitted at trial, possibly letting a guilty defendant go free, solely
because a police officer on the street used inappropriate techniques to obtain the
evidence. Significantly, in United States v. Leon 255 the Court recently adopted
an exception that allows the seized evidence to be admitted if the police officer
acted in good faith reliance on a search warrant. Under this exception, the evi-
dence would still be inadmissible if the police officer, even with a search warrant,
acted without good faith.
256
If the court can exclude evidence that is probative of guilt and jeopardize an
entire criminal prosecution because a police officer acted in bad faith, then it
would certainly be appropriate to order a new trial when a representative of the
state and officer of the court in bad faith keeps evidence relevant to innocence or
punishment from the jury or court. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that
a bad faith standard applied in the Brady area would be an effective deterrent to
intentional prosecutorial misconduct.
One can demonstrate this deterrent effect by viewing this proposed stan-
dard in light of the criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of a deterrent pro-
pounded by Professor Oaks. 257 Professor Oaks posits seven conditions that
affect the efficacy of a rule of deterrence and then examines whether the fourth
254. Although not couching his suggestion in bad-faith terminology, Justice Marshall recom-
mended an equivalent approach in his dissent in Bagley:
In a case of deliberate prosecutorial misconduct, automatic reversal might well be proper.
Certain kinds of constitutional error so infect the system of justice as to require reversal in
all cases, such as discrimination injury selection. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 92
S. Ct. 2163, 33 L.Ed.2d 83 (1972). A deliberate effort of the prosecutor to undermine the
search for truth clearly is in the category of offenses anathema to our most basic vision of
the role of the State in the criminal process.
Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3395 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
255. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
256. See, eg., United States v. Strand, 761 F.2d 449, 456 (8th Cir. 1985) (postal inspector lacked
objectively reasonable basis for believing that a warrant authorizing seizure of stolen mail also au-
thorized seizure of normal household goods so as to permit admission of terms under the "good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule); United States v. Nader, 621 F. Supp. 1076, 1084 (D.D.C.
1985) (warrant so general that the executing officers could not reasonably perceive it to be valid).
257. See Oaks, Studying The Exclusionary Rule In Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cmi. L. RFv. 665,
724-32 (1970).
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amendment exclusionary rule meets each of these conditions. 258 The same
methodology can be used to evaluate the proposed bad faith standard.
1. Risk of Detection, Conviction, and Punishment
As described by Professor Oaks, this criteria actually involves only two ele-
ments, the risk that the wrongdoing will be discovered and the risk that, once
the misdeeds are uncovered, the wrongdoer will be punished. He finds little risk
of either in the fourth amendment area.259 Although there are certainly many
cases in which Brady-type misconduct is not uncovered, the motivation for a
criminal defendant to challenge a conviction on due process grounds and the
large number of these cases actually litigated ensure that there is a significant
possibility that the misconduct will be discovered. Concerning the risk of pun-
ishment, the adoption of a bad faith standard would ensure that, once uncov-
ered, the lawyer's misconduct will be punished.
2. Severity of Penalty
Professor Oaks argues that the exclusionary rule is ineffective because it
penalizes the prosecutor instead of the wrongdoing police officer. In his view,
"the exclusionary rule is well tailored to deter the prosecutor from illegal con-
duct." 26° A bad faith standard would operate to punish the wrongdoer-the
prosecutor who intentionally withheld the exculpatory evidence or presented the
false evidence.
3. Competing Norms of Behavior
Professor Oaks finds that the exclusionary rule is ineffective because the
peers and superiors of police officers sympathize with and condone behavior that
violates the fourth amendment.2 61 To the extent that other prosecutors sympa-
thize with and condone Brady-type misconduct, this problem might also be
present with regard to the proposed bad faith standard. It is ameliorated, how-
ever, by the strong condemnation of Brady-type misconduct expressed by both
the organized bar and national prosecutors' organizations.
262
258. By using these criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed bad faith standards, this
Article is not endorsing Professor Oaks' conclusion that the exclusionary rule has questionable de-
terrent value. Professor Oaks' conclusions have been sharply criticized. See, eg., Canon, The Ex-
clusionary Rule: Have Critics Proven That It Doesn't Deter Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 398 (1979);
Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Po-
lice and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 394-399 (1981).
259. Oaks, supra note 257, at 725-26. Professor Oaks notes that a police officer who has some-
thing to hide and testifies falsely will most often be believed by the judge. In addition he observes
that officers are rarely, if ever, disciplined for violating the fourth amendment. Id.
260. Oaks, supra note 257, at 726-27.
261. Oaks, supra note 257, at 727-29.
262. See supra notes 87-123 and accompanying text. NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS
Standard 13.2 C (Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n 1977) requires disclosure of information that the pros-
ecutor has personal knowledge of that tends to negate or reduce guilt. Standard 17.1 requires coun-
sel for both sides to rectify any deception or misrepresentation. Id. Standard 17.1. The United
States Department of Justice Manual for United States Attorneys states that the due process guaran-
tee and fair trial right of a defendant are "destroyed" when a prosecutor knowingly uses false testi-
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4. Reinforcement by a Sense of Moral Obligation
Professor Oaks finds any sense of moral obligation to comply with the law
undermined in the fourth amendment area by the general attitudes of condona-
tion described above.263 Similarly, condonation by other prosecutors would
weaken a prosecutor's sense of moral obligation to avoid Brady-type miscon-
duct. Again, however, strong condemnation of Brady-type misconduct by the
organized bar and prosecutors' organizations should reinforce a prosecutor's
sense of moral obligation to avoid this misconduct.
5. Motivation for a Prohibited Act
Professor Oaks notes that in many cases police officers, acting in what they
perceive to be an emergency situation, believe they have no choice but to violate
the fourth amendment and risk the future consequences. 264 A prosecutor con-
templating suppressing or falsifying evidence faces no emergency situation. In
addition, although belief in the defendant's guilt does provide some motivation
for a prosecutor to obtain a conviction even by using questionable means, this
incentive for a prosecutor to suppress or falsify evidence would be negated by
the knowledge of a certain reversal if the misconduct is discovered.
6. Effective Communication
In Professor Oaks' view, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is
weakened because "channels of communication between police and courts and
prosecutors are such as to minimize the deterrent effect of the rule."1265 He
notes that police officers often do not understand why courts suppress evidence,
and blame the suppression on judges or prosecutors. 266 There is no such prob-
lem of communication with prosecutors. They are lawyers and are capable of
reading and understanding appellate decisions, especially when the effect of such
a decision requires the prosecutor to retry the case.
7. Clarity of Rule
The fourth amendment rules are confusing and complex. A simple rule
requiring reversal on a finding of bad faith Brady-type misconduct suffers no
such defect.
Under this analysis it appears that a standard requiring reversal for bad
faith Brady-type misconduct would be an effective deterrent. There is, however,
a potential roadblock to the adoption of such a rule-the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncement that the decision in a Brady case should be made "irrespective of
mony to obtain a conviction or supresses evidence favorable to a defendant. UNITED STATES DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, PROVING FEDERAL CRIMES 8-3 to 8-4 (J. Cissel ed. 1980).
263. Oaks, supra note 257, at 729. Professor Oaks does recognize that, over the long term, the
sense of moral obligation imposed by the exclusionary rule may grow. Id.
264. Oaks, supra note 257, at 729-30.
265. Oaks, supra note 257, at 730.
266. Oaks, supra note 257, at 731 n.193.
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the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. '2 67
This roadblock is not necessarily fatal to a bad faith standard. First, state
courts are free to adopt this standard either under their state constitutions268 or,
as the Connecticut Supreme Court has already done, by exercising their supervi-
sory power. 269 Second, it is not altogether clear that such a rule is precluded
even under existing Brady law.
The materiality standards propounded in United States v. Agurs270 and
United States v. Bagley271 leave some room for the proposition that the egre-
giousness of prosecutorial misconduct is a relevant factor in the due process
analysis, although the Court's signals in this respect are certainly mixed. The
Court in Agurs stated that the constitutional obligation to disclose exculpatory
evidence is not measured by "the moral culpability or the willfulness, of the
prosecutor." 272 Yet, the Agurs court also approved a strict standard of material-
ity for perjured or false testimony not only because it corrupts the truth-seeking
function of the trial process, but also because it involves prosecutorial miscon-
duct.273 The Agurs statement that failure to reveal specifically requested evi-
dence is "seldom, if ever, excusable" 274 also demonstrates a concern for
267. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
268. For a description of the burgeoning development of state constitutional law, see Abraham-
son, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951 (1982); Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions:
Some Random Thoughts, 54 Miss. L.J. 371 (1984); Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources
of Fundamental Rights, 35 RuTGERS L. Rxv. 707 (1983).
269. In State v. Cohane, 193 Conn. 474, 479 A.2d 763 (1984), the Connecticut Supreme Court,
after finding that the prosecutor's intentional suppression of a witness' prior inconsistent statement
violated the materiality standards of Brady, expressly invoked its "inherent supervisory authority" to
hold that this misconduct also warranted reversal as a matter of state law. Id. at 499, 479 A.2d at
778. One commentator has argued that the Connecticut Supreme Court had also implicitly adopted
the same rule in cases involving other types of prosecutorial misconduct. See Note, Sticks and
Stones, supra note 143. But see DeFoor & Kalbac, Prosecutorial Misconduct In Closing Argument:
Remedial Measures, 8 AM. J. TRIAL AD. 397, 399-403 (1985) (noting reluctance of Florida Supreme
Court to reverse a conviction absent evidence of prejudice). It would seem that the supervisory
power of the federal courts also could be appropriately used to deter prosecutorial misconduct. See
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735-736 n.8 (1980) (supervisory power can be used to deter
illegal conduct); Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Stat-
utory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. Rav. 1433 (1984); Note, A Sepa-
ration of Powers Approach to the Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 34 STAN. L. RV. 427
(1982). The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983), however,
presents a formidable obstacle. In Hasting the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed defendant's conviction because of the prosecutor's comment on the failure of defendant
to testify. United States v. Hasting, 660 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
Although not expressly relying on the supervisory power, the court reversed because of the failure of
prosecutors to heed its admonitions and conducted only a cursory harmless error review. See Hast-
ing, 461 U.S. at 504-05. The Supreme Court interpreted this to mean that the court of appeals was
relying on its supervisory power, id. at 505, and held that the supervisory power could not be used to
reverse a conviction without applying a harmless error analysis, id. at 507-09. Because a reviewing
court in a Brady case already uses the equivalent to a harmless error analysis in applying the materi-
ality standards, the supervisory power as limited by Hasting is probably useless as a means to deter a
Brady-type misconduct.
270. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
271. 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985).
272. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110. The Court also stated: "If the suppression of evidence results in
constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecu-
tor." Id.
273. Id. at 104.
274. Id. at 106.
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punishing prosecutorial misconduct.
Both the strict materiality standard for false or perjured evidence and the
reasons stated in Agurs for the adoption of this standard were left untouched by
the Bagley decision. The Bagley opinion did vitiate the Agurs "seldom, if ever,
excusable" language by eliminating a separate standard of materiality for spe-
cific-request cases, 275 but the issue of prosecutorial misconduct was irrelevant in
Bagley because the prosecutor did not know that the exculpatory evidence
existed.
276
In Bagley, therefore, the Court's pronouncements on the relevance of bad
faith clearly are dicta, as they also were in Brady and Agurs. In each of these
cases the prosecutor had, at least in the eyes of the Court, acted in good faith.
277
The Court, in contrast, has always reversed the conviction or sentence when it
believed the prosecutor had obviously acted in bad faith.278 A more precise
formulation of the present rule could, therefore, be that the good faith of the
prosecutor is irrelevant in determining whether the evidence suppressed was suf-
ficiently material to require a new trial.
The proposed bad faith rule would serve both to protect the integrity of the
criminal justice system and to deter future misconduct by removing any incen-
tive for a prosecutor to gamble that a decision to suppress or falsify evidence will
be given retrospective approval because of the strength of the other evidence in
the case. It need be applied only when the reviewing court is convinced that the
prosecutor's actions were knowingly and intentionally done to keep relevant evi-
dence from the judge or jury. It could be applied in cases when there is the
intentional use of false or perjured testimony, when there is a deliberate refusal
to respond to a specific request for exculpatory material, or when there is a
failure to disclose evidence so exculpatory that the prosecutor clearly should
have known that disclosure was required.
The proposal to add a bad faith standard to the current Brady doctrine is
not an attempt to make the due process clause a code of ethics for prosecutors.
The purpose is not to punish individual prosecutors, but to deter prosecutors in
the future from committing similar misconduct. As with any rule of deterrence,
275. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
276. The exculpatory evidence consisted of contracts between two witnesses and Alcohol, To-
bacco and Firearms Agents calling for payments to the witnesses in return for their testimony. Bag-
ley, 105 S. Ct. at 3378. The trial prosecutor stated, in stipulated testimony, that he did not know of
the contracts. Id. at 3378 n.4.
277. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97. As noted supra note 32, the Supreme Court's finding in Brady that the
prosecutor acted "without guile" is open to question. See also Babcock, supra note 74, at 1143 n.34
(noting "strong argument" that prosecutor in Brady acted in bad faith).
278. See, eg., supra notes 150-63 and accompanying text (discussing Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1
(1967)); supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264
(1959)); supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957)).
For the view that these earlier Supreme Court perjury cases were more concerned with punishing
deliberate prosecutorial misconduct than with the prejudice to the defendant, see Comment, The
Duty of the Prosecutor, supra note 144, at 864; Comment, The Prosecutor's Duty, supra note 2, at 138.
Professor Babcock notes that, even after Agurs, some lower federal courts still took note of the good
or bad faith of the prosecutor in deciding whether to grant a new trial. Babcock, supra note 74, at
1152 n.71.
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the frequency of its application would be in inverse proportion to its effective-
ness. If effective, it need be used only sparingly.
V. CONCLUSION
Prosecutors often argue that to be effective punishment must be swift and
severe. When it comes to disciplining a prosecutor who commits Brady-type
misconduct, however, punishment is virtually nonexistent. A prosecutor who
suppresses evidence, falsifies evidence, or permits a witness to commit perjury
too often remains unpunished. The remedial measures outlined in this Article
can be implemented with little difficulty or cost. They are the least the bar and
judiciary can do to ensure that future defendants will not be unjustly convicted
and punished because of Brady-type misconduct.
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APPENDIX
To supplement the research done for this Article, the following letter and
Survey form were sent to the State Bar disciplinary bodies in each of the 50
states and the District of Columbia.
Dear Bar Counsel:
I am a law professor at the University of North Carolina engaged in a study
of bar disciplinary proceedings brought against prosecutors for suppression of
exculpatory evidence favorable to the accused or the presentation of false testi-
mony. I plan to include the results of this research in a law review article.
As you perhaps are aware, there are few reported cases in which prosecu-
tors have been the subjects of disciplinary actions. After discussions with several
bar counsel, I have concluded that the only way to gather information in this
area is through direct contact with Bar Counsels' offices throughout the country.
I know that you are continually besieged with lengthy questionnaires re-
quiring an inordinate amount of your time, so I am only asking for very selective
information. What I am interested in are cases since January 1, 1980 in which
prosecutors are accused of violating their duty, embodied in Disciplinary Rule 7-
103(B) and Model Rule 3.8, to turn over to the defense evidence which is
favorable to the accused, or their duty not to present false or perjured evidence
as embodied in DR 7-102(A)(4) and Model Rule 3.3(4). Even if a charge is
brought under a more general provision of your Code, for example, DR 1-
102(A)(4), it should be included if the gist of the complaint is that the prosecu-
tor failed to disclose evidence favorable to the accused or presented false evi-
dence. I should also add that I am interested in cases involving all public
prosecutors, state and federal.
I would very much appreciate it if you could, within the strictures of confi-
dentiality, provide the details of any cases which fit in the above category. If the
cases are reported, of course, a citation would be sufficient.
For your convenience, I have enclosed a brief survey form to be used for
your response. I do hope that you will take the time necessary to respond to this
letter by June 30, 1986 in the enclosed self-addressed and stamped envelope. If
you are uncertain about any aspect of this request, please do not hesitate to call
me collect.





University of North Carolina
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Survey of State Bar Disciplinary Actions Against Prosecutors
Explanatory Note
This survey is designed to cover the time period beginning with January 1,
1980 up to May 15, 1986. If figures for a longer period of time are readily
available, please indicate and include.
1. Jurisdiction
2. Time Period
Beginning January 1, 1980 Yes ( ) No ( )
If "No" Please Specify Other Beginning
Date
3. Number of Disciplinary Proceedings Brought Against Prosecutors For Sup-
pression Of Evidence Favorable To The Accused Or Presentation Of False
Evidence:
a. Resulting In A Formal Complaint.
b. Not Resulting In A Formal Complaint But Involving Some
Sanction (e.g., Informal Admonition, Reprimand,
Censure).
4. Details Of Or Citations To Proceedings Included in #3 (if not




Richard A. Rosen Title
University of North Carolina
School of Law
Address
* Please Complete And Return Even If The Answers To
Number 3 Are "0".
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